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OF PIKETTY AND PERPETUITIES: 
DYNASTIC WEALTH IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (AND BEYOND) 
ERIC KADES* 
Abstract: For the first time since independence, in a nation founded in large 
part on the rejection of a fixed nobility determined by birth and perpetuated by 
inheritance, America is paving the way for the creation of dynastic family 
wealth. Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities in over half the states along 
with sharp reductions in, and likely elimination of, the federal estate tax mean 
that there soon will be no obstacles to creating large pools of dynastic wealth 
insuring lavish incomes to heirs for generations without end. The timing of 
these legal changes could hardly be worse. Marshaling innovative economic 
data extending back centuries, Thomas Piketty has shown that the relatively 
egalitarian incomes enjoyed in developed economies from the end of World 
War II until around 1980 were an aberration and that we are in the process of 
returning to the historical norm of much greater income and wealth inequality. 
This Article shows, unhappily, that this revival of unending inherited wealth is 
of even greater concern than previously thought. In doing so, this Article 
makes three significant contributions to the growing literature on income ine-
quality and its devastating effects. First, this Article reveals the importance of 
Piketty’s work to the law of inheritance, and in particular, it extends his “mac-
ro” economic insights to the “micro” level of families and the potential role 
for newly-legitimated perpetual trusts to instantiate a nobility consisting of a 
relatively small group of families forever privileged by ever-expanding inher-
ited wealth. Second, this Article identifies three devastating consequences of 
perpetuities, consequences that more than justify rules restricting perpetuities. 
Finally, this Article reconceptualizes the harms resulting from perpetuities and 
proposes innovative normative solutions carefully calibrated to ameliorate 
those harms. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although confusing to generations of first-year law students, the Rule 
Against Perpetuities (“RAP”) is considered one of the great victories of 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2019, Eric Kades. All rights reserved. 
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modernity over feudalism. According to the stock narrative, reforming Brit-
ish judges prevented the landed aristocracy from imposing conditions on 
inheritances that would ensure bloodline ownership of estates and other 
wealth in perpetuity.1 The RAP migrated to Britain’s North American colo-
nies, and for centuries steadfastly blocked efforts to create dynastic wealth 
in this country.2 Recently, however, in a doctrinal revolution that shocked 
legal scholars and practitioners, the RAP has essentially disappeared.3 Over 
half the states now permit decedents to create so-called “dynastic trusts” 
that control the disposition of their wealth not just for one or two genera-
tions, but rather for hundreds4 or thousands of years5—or forever.6 Because 
testators can create trusts ruled by the jurisdiction of their choosing,7 any 
wealthy American can now set up a multi-million dollar dynasty trust ensur-
ing that forever her progeny and only her progeny shall enjoy the income 
generated by her bequeathed wealth. 
Whereas the birth of the RAP was driven by public-spirited concern 
about economic efficiency and the plight of the underclass, its death shared 
                                                                                                                           
 1 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 140–170 (Little, Brown, & 
Company, 3d ed. 1915). 
 2 Id. at § 200 (highlighting how the RAP doctrine that was adopted in the United States of 
America was the same as the one in the English colonies). 
 3 See generally HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, AM. COLL. OF TR. & EST. COUNSEL, THE RULE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES: A SURVEY OF STATE (AND D.C.) LAW (2012), http://www.actec.org/
assets/1/6/Zaritsky_RAP_Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2HK-LPPV] (documenting how the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. (AM. LAW INST. 1979) initiated the movement to significantly 
weaken or eliminate the RAP). 
 4 See ALA. CODE § 35-4A-2 (2014) (stating that a transferor’s property distribution plan can 
last for 100 years for property not in trust); id. § 35-4A-5 (stating that a transferor’s property dis-
tribution plan can last for 360 years for property in trust); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2901(A)(2) 
(2012) (stating that a trust can vest up to 500 years after its creation); FLA. STAT. § 689.225(2) 
(1994 & 2012 Supp.) (stating that a trust created after December 2000 can vest within 360 years of 
its creation); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.103(1)(b) (2015) (stating that a nonvested property interest 
can vest within 365 years after it is created); TENN. CODE § 66-1-202(f) (2015) (stating that trusts 
can vest within 360 years, an alternative to common law RAP); REV. CODE WASH. § 11.98.130 
(2018) (stating that trusts are valid for 150 years). 
 5ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.051 (2016) (setting the limit at 1,000 years); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-
1102.5(1)(b)(III) (2016) (setting the limit for post-May 31, 2011 trusts at 1,000 years); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 75-2-1203(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (setting the limit at 1,000 years); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 34-1-139 (2017) (same). 
 6 IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (2012) (allowing perpetual trusts); KY. REV. STAT. § 381.224 (2016) 
(same); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.91–.94. (declaring that there is no RAP for personal property 
held in trust); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2F-9 (West 2014) (declaring there is no RAP in New Jersey); 
OHIO REV. CODE § 2131.09(B)(2) (conveying that there is no RAP if trustee has full powers of 
alienation); 20 PA. CON. STAT. § 6107.1(b) (2016) (declaring that no RAP will apply after Decem-
ber 31, 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (2011) (declaring no RAP in Rhode Island); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (2004) (same in South Dakota); WIS. STAT. § 700.16 (2014) (declaring no 
RAP if trustee has power of alienation). 
 7 See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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none of that noble spirit, and instead was driven by greed.8 Specifically, 
bank trust departments employing clever lawyers and effective lobbyists 
convinced legislatures in state after state to erase the venerable RAP for no 
better reason than to aid them in competing for wealthy people’s trust busi-
ness.9 Despite this seemingly perverse “race to the bottom” in state legisla-
tion,10 few outside of legal academia mourned the RAP’s passing. 
This Article shows that we should mourn RAP’s death. Indeed, from a 
perspective of sound social policy, the timing of the RAP’s disappearance 
could scarcely be worse. In a paradigm-shifting opus, improbable for a 
technical 500-page economics tomb, Thomas Piketty’s best-selling Capital 
in the Twenty-First Century forcefully demonstrates that we are returning to 
a world in which inherited wealth will outweigh earnings, and where in-
come inequality will become even more pronounced than it is today.11 
Piketty’s insights will be explained as they are relevant in the pages below, 
but the core of Piketty’s case for the growing power of inherited wealth is 
his now-famous empirically validated inequality, “r > g,” which signifies 
that the rate of return on wealth (r) exceeds the rate of growth of national 
income (g). Piketty compellingly shows that in a world driven by r > g, 
those receiving large inheritances each generation can enjoy part of their 
return as income, reinvest the remainder, and pass on ever-growing pools of 
wealth that bestow upon their progeny rentier incomes outpacing the labor 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust 
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 373–76 (2005) (dis-
cussing how lawyers would advise their clients who lived in states where the RAP was valid to 
open trusts and designate trustees in states that had already abolished the RAP in order to circum-
vent the RAP limitations). This loophole caused banking institutions in states where the RAP was 
present to push for its abolition in order for them to stay competitive. Id. at 374. 
 9 Id. at 374. 
 10 In the context of state law, “race to the bottom” refers generally to inter-state competitions 
to attract some activity with more and more favorable provisions for narrow interests at the cost of 
the general welfare. In the legal literature, the term was popularized by William L. Cary, Federal-
ism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665–66 (1974). Cary 
argued that states competed with each other to attract incorporation business by enacting corporate 
law provisions more and more favorable to managers and officers, at the expense of shareholders. 
Id. Cary’s use of the term appears to come from a Justice Brandeis dissent in Louis K. Liggett Co. 
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558–59 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ( “Companies were early formed to 
provide charters for corporations in states where the cost was lowest and the law least restrictive. 
The states joined in advertising their wares. The race was not one of diligence but of laxity.”). 
Legal scholars have discussed races to the bottom in other contexts. See generally Alvin Klevorick, 
The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy, 14 YALE J. 
REG. 177 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-
to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). 
 11 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1 (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., Harv. Univ. Press 2014) (arguing that this deepening inequality will undermine the merito-
cratic values of democratic societies). 
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incomes of those who chose their parents unwisely and possess little or no 
wealth.12 This is nothing less than a prescription for a return to Europe’s 
Belle Époque or America’s Gilded Age, the era in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries defined by large pools of inherited wealth.13 
This Article makes three significant contributions to the growing litera-
ture on income inequality and its devastating effects. First, it reveals the 
importance of Piketty’s work to the law of inheritance in general and perpe-
tuities in particular. Scholars have failed to fully appreciate the compelling 
implications of Piketty’s theory for inheritance law.14 This Article identifies 
those implications and, more importantly, extends his “macro” insight about 
the implications of r > g to the “micro” level of families and the potential 
role for newly-legitimated perpetual trusts to instantiate a nobility consist-
ing of a relatively small group of families forever privileged by ever-
expanding inherited wealth.15 Many commentators have dismissed fears 
about perpetual trusts and dynastic family wealth, arguing that geometric 
expansion in the number of descendants would necessarily dilute dynastic 
wealth after a few generations.16 Building on Piketty’s model, I demonstrate 
that their optimism is misplaced.17 Wealthy families, like most American 
families, are having fewer children.18 Lower birth rates coupled with the 
size of the gap between r and g provide strong reason to fear the rise of a 
new aristocracy founded on inherited wealth. 
This Article’s second important contribution is to identify three devas-
tating consequences of perpetuities, consequences that more than justify 
rules restricting perpetuities. Commentators have attempted to defend the 
RAP in the past, but RAP opponents have subjected those defenses to with-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 85–86. 
 13 Gilded Age, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Gilded-Age [https://
perma.cc/3YMM-8ZA6] (describing America’s Gilded Age as a time of great wealth accumu-
lation but simultaneously an era of “greedy industrialists and corrupt politicians”); La Belle 
Époque: The Twilight of the Nineteenth Century, MIAMI DADE COLLEGE, https://www.mdc.edu/
wolfson/academic/artsletters/art_philosophy/humanities/belleepoque.htm [https://perma.cc/VX9L-
7C3K]. 
 14 In one telling feature, his repeated and extended discussion of literary tales of wealth all 
revolve around pursuing brides who had received a large inheritance. See PIKETTY, supra note 11, 
at 104–06, 113–16, 407–22. More directly, he notes that it is possible to have high wealth without 
inheritances and implies that this would be benign. Id. at 384. 
 15 See infra notes 190–221 and accompanying text. 
 16 See generally, e.g., John V. Orth, Escaping the Malthusian Trap: Dynasty Trusts for Seri-
ous Dynasts, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 29, 31 (2013); William J. Turnier & Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Mal-
thusian Analysis of the So-Called Dynasty Trust, 28 VA. TAX REV. 779, 789 (2009). 
 17 See infra notes 190–221 and accompanying text. 
 18 More or Less, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 2012, at 77 (explaining that rich people fall under 
the “k-selection” reproductive strategy where they have fewer offspring in order to provide each 
offspring with detailed care). 
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ering—and legitimate—criticism.19 This Article shows that previous de-
fenders missed the mark because they failed to identify three serious social 
costs of perpetuities.20 First, I show that dynastic trusts are likely to lead to 
an excessively high economy-wide savings rate, which has detrimental 
long-term economic consequences.21 Second, I show that because dynasty 
trusts are controlled by the dead hands of the past, they will be impervious 
to any and all policy levers that state officials employ to affect savings dur-
ing recessions and other economic downturns.22 This second insight power-
fully reinvigorates the so-called “dead hand control” objection to perpetui-
ties: Why on Earth (or any celestial object that might someday sustain a 
human economy) would we permit the wishes of the long dead to dictate 
savings decisions that are detrimental to contemporaneous economic stabil-
ity and growth, and beyond the power of regulators to influence? Third, dy-
nastic trusts restrict heirs from spending their inherited wealth, and thereby 
curtail a powerful mechanism for reducing economic inequality.23 
Perpetuities, then, pose multiple real threats to future generations’ wel-
fare. This Article, however, does not advocate reinstating the RAP. The 
RAP is an absolutist and blunt instrument that is too inflexible to adequately 
address the negative consequences of perpetuities that I identified. Rather, 
the Article’s third significant contribution is that it re-conceptualizes the 
harms resulting from perpetuities and proposes an innovative normative 
solution carefully calibrated to ameliorate those harms. Specifically, the Ar-
ticle re-conceptualizes extended dead-hand control of wealth as the source 
of externalities that impose costs on future generations.24 This Article then 
advocates employing the first and best tool for combatting negative exter-
nalities: taxes calibrated to the harm caused by each external cost. An exter-
nality tax prices out of the practice those who are unwilling or unable to 
cover the social costs of their desired perpetuities, and it efficiently permits 
those who value long-term dead-hand control above its costs to enjoy its 
benefits—after fattening the public treasury with payments equal to the so-
cietal harms imposed. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I brings readers up to speed on 
factual and theoretical predicates necessary to understand the law and poli-
cy of perpetuities.25 Section A demonstrates the extent of wealth inequality 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 240–294 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 240–294 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 190–221 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 222–294 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 240–294 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 240–294 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 38–132 and accompanying text. 
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over the long run of history and shows that after brief improvement in the 
twentieth century, wealth inequality is currently rising from atypically low 
levels towards higher, historically typical levels.26 Section B then docu-
ments one of the most important implications of growing wealth inequality 
today: the increasing role that inherited wealth will play in determining so-
cioeconomic status for the remainder of this century and beyond.27 Section 
C examines these facts under the lens of Piketty’s theoretical framework to 
provide a deeper understanding of how inherited wealth is coming to play a 
dominant role in the distribution of wealth and income.28 Together this ma-
terial provides a basic picture of the mounting importance of inheritance in 
American economic life as the twenty-first century unfolds. 
Part II turns to recent legal developments that, for the first time since 
the Middle Ages, have enabled wealth owners to create perpetual “dynastic” 
trusts.29 Section A documents and describes the virtual disappearance of the 
Rule Against Perpetuities.30 Section B describes the long, expensive cam-
paign being waged by a small group of wealthy families to abolish the Es-
tate Tax, the progress that they have made, and the likelihood that they soon 
will succeed.31 
Part III refutes the contentions of scholars who assert that the ever-
expanding number of descendants will dilute dynastic wealth and reduce the 
threat posed by perpetual trusts.32 In particular, Part III draws on additional 
theoretical work to elucidate incentives to create perpetuities. More im-
portantly, Part III employs basic accounting techniques to show that it is 
indeed quite possible that dynasty trusts can fund relatively high consump-
tion for a growing group of descendants indefinitely.  
Parts I through III provide the first-ever explanation for why the eco-
nomic impact of inheritances is on the rise, how recent legal innovation has 
paved the way for perpetual trusts, why people might create such trusts, and 
how the simple fact of r > g makes perpetual family trusts financial viable 
for indefinite stretches of time.33 
Part IV takes a normative turn.34 Section A summarizes the existing 
scholarly literature and concludes that that the arguments advanced hereto-
fore for limiting perpetuities have justifiably been subject to serious cri-
                                                                                                                           
 26 See infra notes 38–62 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 63–77 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 78–132 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 133–189 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 133–165 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 166–189 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 190–221 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 38–221 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 222–294 and accompanying text. 
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tiques.35 Section B identifies three previously overlooked, highly negative 
consequences of perpetuities that more than justify their limitation.36 Exces-
sively high savings rates by dynastic trusts will both exacerbate recessions 
in the shorter term and potentially reduce social consumption levels in the 
longer term. Locking up wealth in untouchable dynastic trusts will prevent 
heirs from dissipating concentrated wealth in ways that promote economic 
equality and socioeconomic mobility. 
Part V advances the Article’s primary normative proposal.37 It rejects re-
instatement of the RAP because it asserts that policymakers can manage the 
costs imposed by perpetuities more effectively with taxes than with the 
RAP’s outright ban. Because perpetuities are best understood as imposing 
external costs on future generations, then taxation is the preferred method for 
managing such negative externalities. Finally, Part V specifically demon-
strates that an annual tax on capital is preferable to the once-a-generation es-
tate tax to ameliorate the inequitable facets of wealth transmission. 
I. FACTUAL AND THEORETICAL PREDICATES 
A. The Root of the Problem: Extreme and Worsening Wealth Inequality 
This Section sets the stage by detailing the relationship between wealth 
inequality and income inequality and charting their dual upward trajectory. 
Although the academy and the popular press have focused largely on in-
come inequality, thanks to Thomas Piketty, we now know that wealth ine-
quality driven by large inheritances is the much greater concern.38 
We begin with an ironclad rule of economic history: wealth is always 
distributed more unequally than income.39 Although inevitably thin, what 
data we have from the Middle Ages suggests that wealth inequality was 
more than twice as high as income inequality.40 Using a different metric, 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See infra notes 222–232 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 233–239 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 295–341 and accompanying text. 
 38 For an overview of the literature on income inequality, see generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME BETWEEN 1979 AND 2007 (2011), https://
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/10-25-householdincome0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WV23-PQGL]; Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the Unit-
ed States, 1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2003); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Origins of Inequality, and 
Policies to Contain It, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 425 (2015). 
 39 See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Inequality Is Most Extreme in Wealth, Not Income, N.Y. TIMES: 
ECONOMIX BLOG (Mar. 30, 2011), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/inequality-is-
most-extreme-in-wealth-not-income/ [https://perma.cc/FUN8-FDA7]. 
 40 Compare Bruce M.S. Campbell, Benchmarking Medieval Economic Development: Eng-
land, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, c.1290, 61 ECON. HIST. REV. 896, 940 (2008) (noting a Gini 
Index for income inequality of about 0.31 for United Kingdom around 1300), with Nathan Suss-
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Piketty notes the extremely high fraction of total national wealth owned by 
those at the top of the income distribution in Europe around 1900: the top 
10% owned 80–90% of all wealth, and the top 1% owned from 50–60%.41 
This was more than twice as high as the share of total income accruing to 
these elites.42 Generalizing, Piketty states that “we . . . find the same ex-
tremely high concentration of wealth—with 80–90% of capital owned by 
the top decile and between 50–60% by the top percentile—in most societies 
prior to the nineteenth century, and in particular in traditional agrarian soci-
eties in the modern era, as well as in the Middle Ages and antiquity.”43 
Although neither contemporary wealth nor income inequality has re-
turned to these historically high levels, both are on the rise.44 Moreover, 
wealth inequality continues to obey the iron rule of exceeding income ine-
quality. The following table summarizes the essential facts for the U.S. over 
the last thirty years. 45 
  
                                                                                                                           
man, Income Inequality in Paris in the Heyday of the Commercial Revolution 3 (Feb. 2006) (un-
published manuscript), http://degit.sam.sdu.dk/papers/degit_11/C011_043.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2H2R-WXEC] (noting that the wealth Gini for the U.K. at roughly same time was 0.7). The Gini 
Index measures inequality in the distribution of some quantitative good on a scale from zero to 
one, with zero indicating complete equality (every individual has an equal amount of the good) 
and one indicating complete inequality (one individual owns all of the good; everyone else has 
none). See Who, What, Why: What Is the Gini Coefficient?, BBC (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.
bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-31847943 [https://perma.cc/68TE-PP2V] (explaining the 
history of the Gini coefficient and how it measures income inequality). 
 41 PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 339–43. 
 42 Compare id. at 345 fig.10.3 (providing data on wealth inequality), with id. at 327 fig.9.9 
(providing data on income inequality). 
 43 Id. at 345. 
 44 Eric Levitz, Inequality Is Rising Across the Globe—and Skyrocketing in the U.S., NEW 
YORK (Dec. 15, 2017), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/12/inequality-is-rising-globally-and-
soaring-in-the-u-s.html [https://perma.cc/ET4T-RWGQ] (showing alarming statistics about the grow-
ing inequality in income and wealth and the role of policymakers in this deepening divide). 
 45 Author’s calculations based on BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SURVEY OF 
CONSUMER FINANCES (2016) (on file with author). All Tables and Figures are also available at https://
www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/60-1/kades-graphics.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DH7R-VEQQ]. 
154 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:145 
Table 1: Evolution of Top Shares of Wealth and Income in the U.S., 1989–2016 
United 
States 
Share of National 
Wealth 
Share of National 
Income 
Year Top 10% Top 1% Top 10% Top 1% 
1989 67.2% 30.0% 42.3% 17.0% 
2016 77.1% 38.6% 49.9% 23.4% 
Note that wealth inequality is substantially higher than income inequali-
ty. By 2016, for example, the top 10% held an astonishing 77.1% of the na-
tion’s private wealth, dwarfing their still impressive 42.3% of national in-
come. Perhaps even more flabbergasting, the top 1% held almost 39% of na-
tional wealth by 2016, compared to “only” about 23% of national income. 
Other metrics, such as Gini Indices, buttress the case that the iron rule contin-
ues to apply: wealth inequality exceeds income inequality by a considerable 
margin.46 Finally, the data in this table demonstrate that wealth (and income) 
inequality have been trending upward considerably over the last few decades. 
During the years in question, the share of wealth held by the top 1% of 
wealthholders jumped by over eight percent from 30.0% to 38.6%. 
Although we have seen two ways to measure wealth inequality, shares 
held by the top percentiles and Gini Indices, there are a number of other 
measures.47 One particularly illuminating measure that lies at the core of 
both traditional economic models and Piketty’s work is the ratio of capital 
(wealth) to income (denoted K/Y, K for capital, Y for income).48 If wealth 
were distributed according to income, this metric would be of little use. In 
that case, income generated from wealth would be proportional to income 
generated from labor and thus, at least on a percent basis, the distribution of 
wealth would not increase inequality. Given the tremendous wealth inequal-
ity documented in the previous paragraph, however, we know that the in-
come generated by wealth will in turn increase income inequality. 
The K/Y ratio provides a very useful handle for assessing the relative 
economic advantage conferred by that top-heavy wealth. A high ratio means 
that wealth holdings are large relative to national income. This means those 
holding that wealth will command a large share of national income simply by 
                                                                                                                           
 46 For example, from 1983 to 2007, the Gini Coefficient for wealth increased from 0.80 to 
0.83. Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt and 
the Middle-Class Squeeze—an Update to 2007 at 11 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working 
Paper No. 589, 2010), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_589.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4WY-
T3R6]. During that same time period, the Gini Coefficient for income went from 0.48 to 0.57. Id. 
 47 See generally FRANK A. COWELL, MEASURING INEQUALITY (3d ed. 2011) (providing a 
comprehensive but accessible survey of the various inequality metrics). 
 48 PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 164–98. 
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virtue of their asset income, before adding in their labor income. There is a 
strong historical correlation between high inequality and high K/Y ratios.49 
During Europe’s Belle Époque (translated to “Beautiful Era”), from 
1871 to the beginning of World War I in 1914, the K/Y ratio stood at 600% 
to 700%; that is, the capital stocks of France, Germany, and the U.K. were 
worth about six or seven years of national income.50 Historically, this ratio 
is typical. The negative shocks to wealth from the two world wars and the 
Great Depression in the first half of the 1900s cut these K/Y ratios in half, 
down to 200 to 300%.51 This K/Y ratio reduction coincided with very large 
reductions in wealth and income inequality.52 
Since 1950, however, K/Y ratios have trended up considerably. By 
2010, the ratio in a number of developed nations, including the United 
States, had reached 400 to 700%.53 Over the decades since World War II, 
private wealth has slowly but surely reconstituted itself.54 The economic 
weight of this growing pool of wealth (relative to income), concentrated as 
it is among the top centiles, is beginning to make itself felt and looks to be-
come an ever-larger contributor to growing income inequality. 
We conclude this Section by asking a simple but important question: 
why is wealth inequality so much greater than income inequality? We post-
pone one important answer, inheritances, until the following Section.55 
Consider two households that differ only in the labor incomes earned to ex-
plore how the wealthier household might end up with wealth that exceeded 
its proportionate share of income. Assume the wealthier household earned 
$100,000, the other household earned $50,000, both saved and invested 
10% of income, and both earned a 5% return on their investments. Assum-
ing those facts, the wealthier household would then enjoy investment in-
                                                                                                                           
 49 PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 356.  
 50 Thomas Piketty & Gabriel Zucman, Capital Is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Coun-
tries 1700–2010, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1255, 1258 fig.II (2014) (depicting the ratios between private 
wealth and national income from 1870–2010); La Belle Époque, http://www.angelsmyth.com/
belle_epoque.html [https://perma.cc/R3ZT-ZDCW] (highlighting an era of peace and prosperity 
both financially and socially in Europe from 1871–1914). 
 51 Piketty & Zucman, supra note 50, at 1257–58. 
 52 See PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 18–20, 139–41, 167–70; Carola Frydman & Raven Molloy, 
The Compression of Top Income Inequality During the 1940s at 19–23 (Jan. 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://web.mit.edu/frydman/www/compression_0111.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y936-AJC4] 
(focusing on wage inequality in the 1940s with an emphasis on top executive salaries). See gener-
ally WALTER SCHEIDEL, THE GREAT LEVELER: VIOLENCE AND THE HISTORY OF INEQUALITY 
FROM THE STONE AGE TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 115–29 (2017) (highlighting the effects 
of war on the economy and the role of government regulation, inflation, and physical destruction 
on the distribution of income and wealth). 
 53 Piketty & Zucman, supra note 50, at 1258 figs.I & II. 
 54 Id. at 1255. 
 55 See infra notes 63–77 and accompanying text. 
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come of $500 and the less fortunate household $250. The ratio between 
these two numbers is exactly the same as the ratio between their labor in-
comes, 2:1. Under the stated assumptions, wealth inequality will strictly 
mimic income inequality. 
This simple example illustrates two important principles: disregarding 
inheritances (and other gifts), the only way for wealth to be distributed 
more unevenly than income is for the wealthy to either: (i) earn a higher 
rate of return on their investments, or (ii) save a larger proportion of their 
income (or both). 
Although not conclusive, there is strong evidence that those investing 
larger sums earn higher returns. Given the lack of any systematic adminis-
trative or survey data, scholars perforce have examined eclectic evidence to 
shed light on the relationship between an investor’s wealth and the rate of 
return on her investments. As a baseline, annual rates of return over the last 
few decades have averaged around 4%. The world’s wealthiest individuals, 
however, enjoyed annual returns of 6–7%.56 The three American universi-
ties with the largest endowments enjoyed annual returns of 10.2% on their 
assets from 1980–2010. Moreover, for American universities, there is strong 
positive correlation between endowments size and rate of return.57 Piketty 
consequently concludes that “it is quite plausible to think that if the average 
return on capital is 4%, wealthier people might get as much as 6% or 7%, 
whereas less wealthy individuals might have to make do with as little as 2% 
or 3%.”58 He hypothesizes that economies of scale and greater risk toler-
ance enable wealthier households to garner these significantly higher re-
turns. 
Whatever the explanation, markedly higher rates of return on savings 
play a central role in this Article, as will be discussed below, because they 
make perpetual trusts viable. Although an extra 2–3% in returns over one 
year sounds modest, it can make a huge difference over a generation (de-
fined as twenty-five years). Based on the power of compound interest, $100 
dollars of wealth growing at 6.5% will be worth about $483 after twenty-
five years, while the same $100 earning 4% grows to only $266. Piketty 
summarizes how this magnifies the effects of r > g: 
 In view of the law of compound interest . . . [higher returns for 
wealth investors] can account for very rapid divergence, so that if 
there is nothing to counteract it, very large fortunes can attain ex-
treme levels within a few decades. Thus unequal returns on capi-
                                                                                                                           
 56 PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 525. 
 57 Id. at 448 tbl.12.2. 
 58 Id. at 431. 
2019] Dynastic Wealth in the Twenty-First Century (& Beyond) 157 
tal are a force for divergence that significantly amplifies and ag-
gravates the effects of the inequality r > g.59 
Not only do wealthy people earn higher rates of return on their wealth, 
they also put a greater proportion of their income into savings.60 This might 
seem obvious, but as a theoretical matter it is not. If the primary purpose of 
saving was to set aside funds for hard times (for example, loss of job, or a 
large medical claim for the uninsured), then less wealthy households might 
well save at a higher rate. Similarly, if the primary purpose of saving is to 
fund retirement, we might expect everyone to save at the same rate so as to 
preserve the same level of income in retirement as they enjoyed during their 
working years.61 Although there are other viable candidates, the most com-
pelling explanation for savings rates that increase with income and reach 
very high levels at top incomes is the desire to leave bequests.62 We now 
turn to that topic.  
B. Inherited Wealth Making a Comeback 
Given the primacy of the bequest motive for explaining high savings 
rates among the wealthy, it is unsurprising that growing wealth is begetting 
growing inheritances and that growing wealth inequality is begetting grow-
ing inheritance inequality.63 If everyone annuitized all of their wealth (or 
threw a ‘party to die for’ and blew all of their wealth before dying), inher-
itances would be zero and wealth inequality would differ little from income 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Id. 
 60 See Karen E. Dynan et al., Do the Rich Save More?, 112 J. POL. ECON. 397, 438 (2004) 
(finding that there is a strong positive relationship between saving rates and lifetime income). 
 61 See Franco Modigliani & Richard H. Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Consumption 
Function: An Interpretation of Cross-section Data, in POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 388, 388–
436 (Kenneth K. Kurihara ed., 1954) (discussing the famous “life-cycle” model of savings for the 
first time); see also Orazio P. Attanasio, Consumption, in 1 HANDBOOK OF MACROECONOMICS 
741, 760–80 (John B. Taylor & Michael Woodford eds., 1999) (providing in-depth literature on 
the life cycle model that is used to study consumption behavior). 
 62 See Dynan et al., supra note 60, at 435 (stating that the high savings rates for higher-
income groups is fueled by a motive to bequest). Furthermore, “the very high saving rates of the 
top 1 percent or top 5 percent are difficult to explain any other way.” Id.; see also Marco Cagetti 
& Mariacristina De Nardi, Wealth Inequality: Data and Models, 12 MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS 
285, 307 (2008) (highlighting that saving in order to leave bequests is a driving force for higher 
income individuals); James B. Davies & Anthony Shorrocks, Wealth & Economic Inequality, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 605, 621 (Anthony B. Atkinson & François Bourguignon 
eds., 1999) (arguing that “[i]ntentional bequest behaviour is likely to be required in order to ex-
plain the shape of the upper tail of the wealth distribution”). 
 63 See supra Table 1 & note 45. 
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inequality.64 Capital income would magnify inequalities during the large 
wealth-holder’s life, but its dissipation would prevent it from passing on 
inequality and immobility to the next generation. That, of course, is not how 
it works. The evidence is clear: leaving bequests to descendants is a prime 
motivation for accumulating wealth.65 
Inheritance inequality in the United States mirrors that of wealth ine-
quality.66 In general, only about 20% of American households will ever re-
ceive a significant inheritance or inter vivos gift.67 Yet, households in the 
top 1% of incomes receive about 35% of all inheritance dollars and house-
holds in the top 10% receive about 73%.68 The analogous percentages for 
wealth acquisition are 33.8% for households in the top 1% of income and 
80.5% for households in the top 10% of incomes.69 The largest inheritances 
generally are not dissipated in one generation.70 For households in the top 
1% of incomes great wealth can be transferred to multiple generations.71 
Unfortunately, data on the historical evolution of inheritance flows in 
the United States is scarce, so at present we cannot put these current num-
bers into a longer-term context.72 Over the long run, trends in income, 
wealth, and inheritance tend to be correlated across developed economies. 
For example, France has particularly strong historical data on inheritances 
due to a tax on bequests and gifts that the nation has imposed continuously 
since the eighteenth century.73 In keeping with the idea that examining the 
ratio of wealth to national income (K/Y) is a useful way to assess the influ-
                                                                                                                           
 64 WILLIAM F. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 573 (3d ed. 1985) (stating that an annuity is “a contract 
in which an insurance company [or other financial intermediary] promises to pay a given amount 
each month to the purchaser, until the latter dies”). Annuitizing enables people to insure against 
outliving their wealth. Id. 
 65 See Dynan et al., supra note 60, at 435. 
 66 See EDWARD N. WOLFF, INHERITING WEALTH IN AMERICA: FUTURE BOOM OR BUST? 3–4 
(2015) (describing the relationship between inheritance inequality and wealth inequality). 
 67 Id. at 3. 
 68 Id. at 4. 
 69See supra Table 1 & note 45. 
 70 Stephen Mihm, Opinion, The Children of the Rich Will Always Be with Us, BLOOMBERG 
(July 10, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-10/rich-kids-inheritances-
will-last-many-generations [https://perma.cc/JDP6-6PZH] (arguing that it would take four centu-
ries for a wealthy family’s wealth to dissipate to that of an average household). 
 71 Wolff, supra note 46, at 3 (arguing that wealth transfers for those in the top one percent of 
incomes form part of a dynasty). 
 72 See Thomas Piketty & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth and Inheritance in the Long Run, in 2B 
HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 1303, 1341–42 (Anthony Atkinson & François Bourgui-
gnon eds. 2015) (describing a paucity of historical data on inheritance in the United States). 
 73 Thomas Piketty, On the Long-Run Evolution of Inheritance: France 1820–2050, 126 Q.J. 
ECON. 1071, 1096 (2011) (illustrating the long run effects of wealth accumulation, growth, and 
inheritance on inequality). 
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ence of wealth, the following figure charts the inheritance each year as a 
fraction of national income in France from 1820 to 2010.74 
 
Figure 1: Annual Inheritance Flow as a Fraction of National Income,  
France 1820–2010
 
Throughout the 1800s, inheritances each year amounted to anywhere 
from 15–25% of national income. This bespeaks an economic climate where 
inheritances matter. If inheritance dollars were spread evenly, then on aver-
age, generationally, bequests would add around 20% to everyone’s income. 
That is real money. Inheritances, however, are distributed unequally and thus 
the relatively high flow in the nineteenth century was a major factor driving 
economic inequality. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the serious dent that the world wars and the 
Great Depression inflicted on wealth took a large bite out of inheritances.
Thus, Figure 1 shows that annual inheritances fell to around 4% of national 
income in France after World War II and remained below 7% through 1980. 
At a small fraction of their earlier peak level, inheritances were virtually 
irrelevant economically during France’s “Les Trente Glorieuses”—the 
“Glorious Thirty Years” from 1946–1975, when the economic condition of 
the French working and middle classes improved consistently and marked-
ly.75 As Figure 1 above shows, however, French inheritances since then 
                                                                                   
74 Piketty & Zucman, supra note 72, at 1335 fig.15.17. Figure 1 in this Article is simplified 
from the original in Piketty & Zucman’s work, using only the estate data from that original figure. 
See also supra note 45. 
 75 See generally JEAN FOURASTIÉ, LES TRENTE GLORIEUSES, OU LA RÉVOLUTION INVISIBLE 
DE 1946 À 1975 [THE GLORIOUS THIRTY, OR THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION FROM 1946 TO 1975] 
(1979). Other western European nations have similarly rosy monikers for the period of robust 
growth enjoyed during the recovery decades after World War II, such as “Wirtschaftswunder” (or 
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have been on the rise. The same is true for Britain, Germany, and other Eu-
ropean nations.76 One of Piketty’s central conjectures is that inheritances are 
well on their way to reestablishing themselves as one of the most important 
forms of wealth transmission in all developed economies.77 Given the high-
ly unequal distribution of wealth, this necessarily implies greater wealth and 
income inequality. 
C. Piketty’s Framework: Understanding Wealth (Capital) and Inheritance 
in the Twenty-First Century (r > g Writ Large) 
In a monumental achievement, economists (including Piketty) over the 
last thirty-odd years have assembled high quality data on a number of vari-
ables essential to understanding the evolution of inequality, which goes 
back to the early 1800s.78 The figures presented below extend this long-
term perspective back an order of magnitude further, over 2,000 years, in 
tracing Piketty’s two key variables, r (the rate of return on capital) and g 
(the growth rate of the economy). This Section presents historical evidence 
for the inequality r > g, and explains both (i) why this inequality was ‘tem-
porarily suspended’ during the 1900s, and (ii) why it is on its way to reas-
serting itself in the 2000s.79 This Section then outlines the theory behind the 
effect of r > g on inequality over the long term.80 Piketty’s theoretical 
framework is essential for understanding why the legal changes analyzed in 
Part II likely will have such deleterious effect on the (mal)distribution of 
wealth and income. 
                                                                                                                           
“economic miracle”) in Germany, and “Il Miracolo economic” (or “economic miracle”) in Italy. 
See generally Barry Eichengreen & Albrecth Ritschl, Understanding Western German Economic 
Growth in the 1950s (London School of Econ., Working Papers No. 113/08, 2008), http://www.
lse.ac.uk/Economic-History/Assets/Documents/WorkingPapers/Economic-History/2008/WP113.
pdf [https://perma.cc/265K-WJWA] (describing the German Wirtschaftswunder); Giangiacomo 
Nardozzi, The Italian “Economic Miracle”, RIVISTA DI STORIA ECONOMICA, no. 2, 2003, at 139 
(describing the Italian “Miracolo economico”). 
 76 PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 525. 
 77 Id. at 398 (explaining that inheritances and gifts in the twenty-first century will be much 
higher than they were in the twentieth century). 
 78 See generally P.H. Lindert, Three Centuries of Inequality in Britain and America, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 167 (Anthony B. Atkinson & François Bourguignon eds., 
2000); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 
118 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2003); Piketty & Zucman, supra note 72; Anthony B. Atkinson, Wealth and 
Inheritance in Britain from 1896 to the Present (London School of Econ., Ctr. for Analysis of 
Social Exclusion, Working Paper No. CASE/178, 2013), http://darp.lse.ac.uk/papersdb/Atkinson_
(JEI18).pdf [https://perma.cc/6T62-4AFL]. 
 79 See infra notes 78–132 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 114–132 and accompanying text. 
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The following figure shows the evolution of r and g over the last 2000 
years, along with a forecast of their likely path for the remainder of the 
twenty-first century.81 The rate of return here is before tax, and before capi-
tal losses (for example, it includes dividends paid on stocks, but not in-
creases or decreases in the share price). 
 
Figure 2: Rate of Return (r) vs. Growth Rate (g) at the World Level, 
from Antiquity Until 2100 
 
The path of r (rate of return of capital) is simpler than that of g (growth 
rate of the economy), but it is remarkable in its own way because capital 
has, on average, yielded around a 4.5–5% return since the beginning of the 
first millennium. Land has been the primary form of capital for most of hu-
man history, and its approximate rental rate in agrarian societies across time 
and location has always been around 5%.82 This same 5% rental rate ap-
pears time and again as the implied rate of return on fortunes in the nine-
teenth century novels of Jane Austen and Honoré de Balzac.83 Given the 
enormous changes in economic life over the last 2017 years, this near-
constancy is truly astonishing. We can state “r = 5%” as a third iron fact of 
economic history.84 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Piketty & Zucman, supra note 72, at 1357 fig.15.27. 
 82 PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 353. See also supra note 45. 
 83 Id. at 53. 
 84 See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. It is important to remember that this is an 
average of all rates of return. We have good evidence that larger fortunes yield above-average 
returns, and this fact exacerbates the tendency of r > g to concentrate wealth and widen inequality, 
as discussed above. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
162 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:145 
For the purposes of studying owners’ return on their wealth, the r de-
picted in Figure 2 above may be inflated for two reasons. First, govern-
ments tax capital income, though this is almost entirely a modern phenome-
non.85 Second, owners suffer reductions in wealth when the price of their 
assets fall (“capital losses”). The following figure adjusts r to reflect these 
two factors (g is unchanged from Figure 2).86 
 
Figure 3: After-Tax, After-Gains/Losses Rate of Return (r) vs. Growth Rate 
(g) at the World Level, from Antiquity Until 2100 
 
Note that r is unchanged up to 1913, reflecting the almost total absence 
of taxes on capital income and the lack of data on asset prices. The sharp 
drop in returns in Figure 3 as compared to Figure 2 reflects both the enact-
ment of significant taxes on capital income and the sharp decline in most 
asset prices caused by the world wars and the Great Depression. Since then, 
r has rallied considerably and appears headed back up towards its historical-
ly typical level of 5%. 
The evolution of g has been less static. One way of accounting for 
growth is national income increases come from either more workers (demo-
graphic growth) or greater output per worker (productivity growth).87 Alt-
hough we lack detailed population data for most of the last 2000 years, sim-
ple calculations suggest we should infer low demographic growth rates for 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See generally Jane G. Gravelle, Capital Gains Taxes: An Overview (Cong. Res. Serv., Rep. 
No. 96-769, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/96-769.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8W7-4FJR] (provid-
ing an overview of capital taxation in the United States). 
 86 Piketty & Zucman, supra note 72, at 1357 fig.15.28. 
 87 See CHARLES I. JONES, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 3–11 (2d ed. 2002). 
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most of that period. Recent estimates put the world’s population as of the 
year 1 at anywhere from 213–300 million people.88 The world’s population 
as of 2015 was about 7.3 billion.89 Using the low-end estimate of 213 mil-
lion, a constant population growth rate of 1% since year 1 would imply an 
astronomical population of over 108 quadrillion people as of 2015.90 Ra-
ther, from the statistics we have, we can infer that population grew at a rate 
well below one half of one percent a year until 1900. It peaked at an annual 
rate of just over 2% in the 1960s. It has since fallen considerably, to an an-
nual rate of about 1.1%.91 
Although more difficult to measure, both historically and contempora-
neously, similar calculations show that productivity growth has also been 
quite low over the long run of history.92 Productivity growth of even 1% a 
year would imply that over 2015 years per capita income would increase by 
a factor of almost 510 million.93 We are certainly better off than our ances-
tors from two millennia past, but not that much better. Of course, productiv-
ity gains over the last couple of centuries have been higher, though not as 
high as many think. For the world’s seven largest economies, for instance, 
productivity growth has fallen from 2.9% a year in the 1970s to only 1.4% 
from 2000–2012.94 Economies playing catch-up in transitioning to modern 
industrial and service economies do experience bursts of high productivity 
gains, but these do not last. Korea, for example, enjoyed annual productivi-
ty gains of almost 8% a year in the late 1980s, but by 2012 the rate had fall-
en to 3.4%.95 
The historical record suggests that income growth was well below 1% 
for most of the last 2000 years until both population and productivity started 
                                                                                                                           
 88 2 ANGUS MADDISON, THE WORLD ECONOMY: HISTORICAL STATISTICS (placing the esti-
mate at 213 million); UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, THE WORLD AT SIX 
BILLION 4–5 (2015) (estimating 300 million); Human Population: Population Growth, POPULA-
TION REFERENCE BUREAU (July 1, 2016), https://www.prb.org/humanpopulation/ [https://perma.
cc/X5YV-YKVP] (estimating 300 million, as well). 
 89 UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: 
THE 2015 REVISIONS, KEY FINDINGS AND ADVANCE TABLES 8 (2015), https://esa.un.org/unpd/
wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HUF-FT3F]. 
 90 213,000,000*(1.01)2015 ≈ 108,600,000,000,000,000. This is just the basic equation for ex-
ponential growth, starting at 213 million and growing at 1% for 2,015 years. See Eric W. Weis-
stein, Law of Growth, WOLFRAM MATHWORLD (Dec. 11, 2018), http://mathworld.wolfram.com/
LawofGrowth.html [https://perma.cc/SB57-ZMBE]. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Piketty & Zucman, supra note 72, at 1357 fig.15.28. 
 93 (1.01)2015 ≈ 510,000,000. See supra note 90 (noting the exponential growth equation). 
 94 See Labor Productivity Growth in the Total Economy, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
DEV. (OECD), https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDYGTH [https://perma.cc/ZRZ9-
63CM] (listing that data). 
 95 See id. 
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rising at the dawn of the Industrial Age in the 1700s.96 Truly spectacular 
income growth occurred from 1945 until the mid-1970s, as the world en-
joyed ‘catch-up’ productivity and population gains after the crippling 
shocks of world wars and the Great Depression. Forecasts for the future of 
growth, however, are not as rosy; best estimates are that by the end of the 
twenty-first century income growth (demographic plus productivity) will 
dip below 2%—still historically high but much lower than growth occurring 
in the decades after World War II. 
Figure 3 above captures not only epochal trends in human history, but 
also includes best-estimate forecasts of economic evolution in these key 
variables for the remainder of the twenty-first century, which is discussed 
later in this Section. The bottom line is a four-part story: 
 1) throughout most of human history, r has exceeded g by a consid-
erable amount; 
 2) accounting for capital income taxes and asset price declines, there 
was a sharp divergence leading to the inversion r < g due to the 
world wars and the Great Depression, along with strong growth; 
 3) since 1945 r has recovered much lost ground but g has reached 
historically unprecedented levels to maintain the inversion r < g; 
but 
 4) best forecasts suggest that r will continue its recovery and g will 
fall. So that inversion will disappear, r > g will reassert itself by 
2050, and it will reach historically typical levels by the end of the 
twenty-first century. 
Before examining in some detail the powerfully inequality-producing 
impact of r > g, it is important to keep in mind the highly unequal distribu-
tion of wealth previously discussed.97 
[I]f capital ownership were equally distributed and each worker 
received an equal share of profits in addition to his or her wages, 
virtually no one would be interested in the division of earnings 
between profits and wages. If the capital-labor split gives rise to 
so many conflicts, it is due first and foremost to the extreme con-
centration of the ownership of capital.98 
 To oversimplify, r represents the return to rentiers whose income 
comes exclusively from assets (for example, rents on realty; dividends on 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See supra Figure 3 & note 45. 
 97 See supra, notes 38–62 and accompanying text. 
 98 PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 40. 
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stocks; interest on bonds); g represents the growth of working folks’ labor 
incomes.99 If everyone owned the same amount of property, everyone 
would enjoy the same (relatively modest) capital income and, to the extent 
they saved this income, the same growth in their wealth. 
Given rather steep wealth inequality, however, there is a strong ten-
dency, rooted in simple but inevitable accounting identities, for fortunes in 
wealthier families to snowball through generations of growing inheritances. 
Piketty summarizes the basic logic: 
When the rate of return on capital significantly exceeds the 
growth rate of the economy (as it did through much of history un-
til the nineteenth century and as is likely to be the case again in 
the twenty-first century), then it logically follows that inherited 
wealth grows faster than output and income. People with inherit-
ed wealth need save only a portion of their income from capital to 
see that capital grow more quickly than the economy as a whole. 
Under such conditions, it is almost inevitable that inherited 
wealth will dominate wealth amassed from a lifetime’s labor by a 
wide margin, and the concentration of capital will attain extreme-
ly high levels—levels potentially incompatible with the merito-
cratic values and principles of social justice fundamental to mod-
ern democratic societies.100 
He later puts it in more concrete terms. 
For example, if g = 1% and r = 5%, saving one-fifth of the in-
come from capital (while consuming the other four-fifths) is 
enough to ensure that capital inherited from the previous genera-
tion grows at the same rate as the economy. If one saves more, 
because one’s fortune is large enough to live well while consum-
ing somewhat less of one’s annual rent, then one’s fortune will in-
crease more rapidly than the economy, and inequality of wealth 
will tend to increase even if one contributes no income from la-
bor. For strictly mathematical reasons, then, the conditions are 
ideal for an “inheritance society” to prosper—where by “inher-
itance society” I mean a society characterized by both a very high 
concentration of wealth and a significant persistence of large for-
tunes from generation to generation.101 
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To understand the mechanism Piketty describes, it is helpful to trace 
the accumulation of wealth across a generation and compare it to the in-
come of a similar worker who possesses no wealth.102 Sticking with Piket-
ty’s numbers quoted in the previous paragraph, we assume national income 
g is growing at 1% while the return on capital r is 5%. A laborer (L), per-
haps a first-year associate at a large firm, starts her working life earning 
$200,000. Although she doesn’t make partner (the top 1%), she chugs along 
as an “of counsel” employee and her raises keep pace with the growth rate 
of the economy. By the end of a fifty-year career, L will enjoy an income of 
almost $330,000. Note that the increase in her income does not reflect infla-
tion, which we assume is zero. Rather, it reflects the real growth of the 
economy—her annual 1% raises were by design tied to the economy’s 
growth rate. Finally, observe the power of compounded growth. If L’s annu-
al raises were limited to 1% of her initial income, $2,000 a year, her salary 
on retirement after fifty such raises would have been $300,000 instead of 
$330,000. Receiving raises every year based on her current salary, incorpo-
rating previous raises, results in about a 10% higher end-of-career salary. 
The power of such compounding at a higher rate plays a central role 
in understanding the increase in wealth of L’s counterpart, B, who inherits 
$10 million on the same day that L begins her career. This number corre-
sponds roughly to the minimum wealth necessary to put B in the top 1% of 
wealth-holders in the United States in 2015.103 It is thus by no means an 
extraordinary level of wealth; one out of every 100 American households 
enjoys at least this level of wealth and of course many enjoy substantially 
more. There are many ways that B could choose to apportion the annual 
income from her fortune (starting out at 5% of $10 million, or $500,000). 
We will consider two illustrative alternatives: “minimalist” and “maximal-
ist” savings. 
Using a minimalist saving strategy, B sets aside just enough income 
each year so that her pool of wealth grows at the same rate as the economy. 
Given that the economy is growing at only 1% while her fortune is growing 
at 5%, B can achieve this result by saving one-fifth of her 5% returns and can 
consume the remaining 4%. With this savings rate of one-fifth, or 20%, after 
fifty years B’s fortune will increase from $10 million to almost $16.5 million. 
In addition, her consumption will increase from $400,000 (consuming 80% of 
                                                                                                                           
 102 The detailed calculations underlying these examples appear in an on-line appendix available at 
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/60-1/kades-appendix.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BC8J-56WD]. 
 103 Author’s calculations based on SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 45. In 2016, 
this survey indicates that wealth at the 99th percentile was $10,350,300. 
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initial income) almost $660,000. Under this minimalist savings strategy, B 
enjoys much greater gains in consumption that her laboring counterpart L. 
Moreover, B will be able to leave her children $16.5 million. If she has 
but one child, that child will, in a relative sense, be just as well off as B was 
on receiving her inheritance: the child’s wealth equals B’s wealth grown at 
the same rate as national income. The child can pursue the same strategy as 
B, begin life consuming as much as B at retirement, $660,000, and continue 
to grow the family fortune in line with the economy as a whole. If B has 
more than one child, her fortune must be split into two or more pieces (as-
suming she doesn’t favor one and leave everything to that child—in a mod-
ern version of the feudal practice of primogeniture) and the accumulative 
power of wealth will be significantly attenuated. If B has multiple children, 
their inherited wealth will not support their mother’s lifestyle and they will 
leave correspondingly less to their children. 
If B has a sufficiently strong urge to establish dynastic family wealth, 
however, she can instead choose a “maximalist” savings strategy. It is not 
maximalist in the strong sense of saving every cent of wealth-generated in-
come in excess of that necessary to live a thread-bare existence approaching 
poverty. Rather, it is maximalist in the weaker sense of saving every cent in 
excess of that needed to ‘keep up with the Jones,’ or, in this case, to keep up 
with the consumption of laboring L. 
Under the “maximalist” savings regimen, when B receives her inher-
itance of $10M yielding (at 5%) income of $500,000, she consumes only 
$200,000, and saves the remaining $300,000. This amounts to a savings rate 
of 60%. If B continues to spend just enough to keep up with L, the power of 
compounded growth comes into full bloom. In service of her strong taste to 
fund a dynasty, B will increase her savings rate to 90% after 50 years, yet 
still enjoying consumption equal to L’s total income. At the end, B’s wealth 
will reach an astonishing $65 million—over six times her inheritance. 
More importantly, this $65 million is about four times the amount that 
B would have accumulated had she pursued the minimalist savings path 
which was designed to keep her wealth growing at the same rate as national 
income. This radically improves the prospects for dynastic family wealth. B 
can now afford to have four children and leave each of them about $16 mil-
lion. Again, this exceeds the fortune that she inherited, $10 million, by an 
amount that matches growth in national income. B’s descendants will 
roughly inherit the same relative economic power as their mother. If they 
and succeeding generations pursue the same maximalist savings strategy, 
geometrically increasing numbers of B’s progeny will enjoy very comforta-
ble existences that keep up with growing national income levels without 
working a day in their lives. If B and her descendants have on average few-
er than four children, they can afford to increase their consumption at a rate 
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exceeding g (1% in these examples). They could spend the surplus on a lav-
ish lifestyle, or on influencing the political process to protect their privi-
leged status over those (like L) without significant wealth. 
There is nothing special about the numbers used in this example. The 
key point is that with r at 5%, it is relatively easy for wealth growth to ex-
ceed descendant growth. If once a generation (twenty-five years) each de-
scendant has two children, the set of descendants grows at about 2.8% a 
year averaged over time. With an r of 5%, a dynasty trust can handily ac-
commodate the growing brood of beneficiaries. 
This all depends, of course, on maintaining a very high savings rate. 
Even if B’s desires to establish or continue dynastic family wealth are 
strong enough to restrain her from consuming more, it is unlikely that all of 
her descendants in future generations will voluntarily decide to be so frugal. 
Someone through the generations will value fancy cars and first-class travel 
over growing the family fortune. This of course is precisely where perpetui-
ties enter the equation. B has very good reasons, discussed in Part IV, Sec-
tion C, for trying to enforce her desire for endless dynastic wealth on all of 
her descendants, as it is virtually certain some of them will prefer to dissi-
pate the family fortune on consumption of one form or another.104 
Contrast B and her descendants with L, whose progeny will have to 
find their own way in the world. True, L could save considerable sums, but 
not anything approaching $10 million. That is close to her lifetime earnings, 
and even the power of compound interest could not bring here close to ac-
cumulating an estate of $10 million. In highlighting the centrality of r > g, 
Piketty focuses our attention not on any consumption advantage that B or 
her heirs might enjoy over L and her heirs, but rather on the separation of 
society into a divide between a leisured class of ever-expanding wealth and 
a working class with essentially no wealth. This division will span genera-
tions indefinitely, fueled by r > g. 
Whenever the rate of return on capital is significantly and durably 
higher than the growth rate of the economy, it is all but inevitable 
that inheritance (of fortunes accumulated in the past) predomi-
nates over saving (wealth accumulated in the present) . . . . The 
inequality r > g in one sense implies that the past tends to devour 
the future: wealth originating in the past automatically grows 
more rapidly, even without labor, than wealth stemming from 
work, which can be saved. Almost inevitably, this tends to give 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See infra notes 241–294 and accompanying text (explaining the motivation behind dynas-
tic wealth and its effect on the economy). 
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lasting, disproportionate importance to inequalities created in the 
past, and therefore to inheritance.105 
The discussion of Piketty’s model so far may not have sufficiently il-
luminated the role that a low growth rate of national income (g) plays in the 
“tendency of the past to devour the future.”106 The mechanism is two-fold, 
reflecting the fact (discussed earlier) that g can be partitioned into two fac-
tors: (i) demographic growth (a growing population of workers); and (ii) 
productivity growth (growing output per worker).107  
The demographics of family size play a large role in inherited wealth’s 
influence.108 To take an extreme example, in a world in which each couple 
has ten children, it is clearly better as a general rule not to count too much on 
inherited wealth, because the family wealth will be divided by ten with each 
new generation. In such a society, the overall influence of inherited wealth 
would be strongly diminished, and most people would be more realistic to 
rely on their own labor and savings. Recall, in the example depicted above, 
that in order for B to support multiple children in the style to which their par-
ents were accustomed, she had to save a much higher share of her capital in-
come. Even if a wealthy family were to have only one child per generation, if 
pure demographic growth is high (but not quite as high as r), a dynasty can 
preserve its standard of living indefinitely but its wealth as a share of national 
income will be continually shrinking and thus continually reducing its ability 
to exercise inordinate influence in political and other social spheres. 
Piketty uses a similar hypothetical to explain the equalizing effect of 
rapid growth. He argues that: 
[I]n a society where output per capita grows tenfold every genera-
tion, it is better to count on what one can earn and save from 
one’s own labor: the income of previous generations is so small 
compared with current income that the wealth accumulated by 
one’s parents and grandparents doesn’t amount to much.109 
Here Piketty seems to contemplate a world of inversion, in which r < g. In a 
booming economy, with output per worker growing so rapidly, pools of 
                                                                                                                           
 105 PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 377–78 (emphasis added). 
 106 Paraphrasing italicized text from PIKETTY as quoted supra note 105 and accompanying 
text. 
 107 See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 108 See PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 83 (using an extreme example of how the effect of inherit-
ed wealth would be diminished in a world in which each couple has ten children resulting in most 
people relying on their own labor and savings). 
 109 PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 84. 
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wealth that seemed large twenty-five or fifty years ago will shrink markedly 
relative to rapidly rising incomes.110 
So far we have looked at divergent wealth and income outcomes for 
individual families under r > g. The inequality, of course, also has important 
macroeconomic implications—effects that reverberate through the entire 
economy.111 Perhaps the single most important macroeconomic effect of 
r > g is on the accumulation of capital. In the examples contrasting B and L 
above, we saw that if r exceeds g by a material amount, wealthy families 
can simultaneously (i) consume at a fairly high level that grows in tandem 
with national income, and (ii) save very large percentages of their income to 
propagate their privileged position to their descendants. In our “maximalist” 
savings alternative for B, the savings rate reached 90% and would keep on 
rising if we examined matters over a longer horizon. 
If it is going to yield a return, all of that savings cannot sit idle under a 
mattress. Piketty follows the usual assumption of longer-term economic 
theory and abstracts away from the business cycles that may arise from a 
mismatch between investment and savings.112 The wealthy hold the lion’s 
share of society’s wealth,113 and if we are returning to a world in which r 
exceeds g by a considerable margin, then we should expect a rise in savings 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See id. It is worth pausing to reflect on the time frame relevant to Pikettian dynamics. 
Most economics focuses on the shorter term (for example, growth next year) or the turns in a 
business cycle (typically lasting from four-six years). See, e.g., U.S. Business Cycle Expan-
sions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/cycles.
html [https://perma.cc/35UT-DVY8]. Piketty’s focus is much longer-term given his concern 
about the propagation of inherited wealth. Inheritance is a once-a-generation event and hence 
generations are the relevant time unit for him—a generation equaling about twenty-five 
years. See Donn Devine, How Long Is a Generation? Science Provides an Answer, ANCESTRY 
MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 51,. The fact that r is 5% and g is only 1% does not make a monu-
mental difference over one or even a few years. Twenty-five years, however, is another mat-
ter. To give an example of the importance of such a time frame in accounting for the ramifi-
cations of r > g, note that a 3% annual raise doesn’t seem dramatically greater than a 1% 
raise, but a series of 1% raises over 25 years will raise pay by only 28% (1.0125), while 25 
years of 3% raises will more than double pay (109% increase = 1.0325). 
 111 Joseph Stiglitz, Inequality, Wealth, and Capital, QUERIES MAG., Summer 2015, at 56, 
https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/sites/jstiglitz/files/Inequality%2C%20Wealth%20
and%20Capital.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ99-JV98] (arguing that “[m]ost readers of Piketty’s book 
get the impression that the accumulation of wealth through savings is almost entirely responsible 
for the rise in inequality and that there is, therefore, a link between growth of the economy—the 
accumulation of capital—on the one hand and inequality and wealth on the other”). 
 112 See, e.g., Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. 
ECON. 65, 66–68 (1956) (discussing that long-run model). We later remove this assumption to 
consider how excess savings can lead to more frequent and deeper recessions—the so-called “par-
adox of thrift.” See infra notes 242–265 and accompanying text. 
 113 See supra notes 38–62 and accompanying text. 
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and thus a rise in the amount of capital in the economy. Perhaps more im-
portantly, lower growth also tends to increase the relative amount of capital. 
There are many ways to determine the level of capital in an econo-
my.114 As with our discussion of family wealth, one particularly insightful 
way is to consider the ratio of capital to national income, or K/Y. Since all 
savings are invested, the capital stock (K) must be growing at the rate of 
savings. National income (Y) is by definition growing at rate g. Thus if the 
savings rate and the growth rate remain unchanged for a long time, they 
determine the ratio of K to Y. Note that, all else equal, slow growth tends to 
raise this measure of capital intensity. 
In an r > g world, we have already discussed why the saving rate (s) is 
relatively high. We have also summarized Piketty’s argument that income 
growth (g) is likely to revert to relatively low levels over this century. This 
means that, as a matter of simple accounting, the ratio of capital to income, 
K/Y, is likely to increase in the coming decades. This is called “capital 
deepening,” the idea being that there is more capital (for example, ma-
chines) attached to each worker. 
To finish this summary of Piketty’s model, we must answer two ques-
tions raised by this process of capital deepening: 
 1) Won’t all of that capital deepening depress returns on capital, 
closing the gap between r and g? 
 2) Isn’t more capital always a good thing? 
The first question stems from simple economic logic. All else equal, an 
increase in the supply of something (capital, K) invariably reduces its price 
(return on capital, r). The question is: how much will r fall as K increases? 
The answer to this question depends on the value of an obscure economic 
parameter, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.115 Intui-
tively, this factor measures how easy it is to switch between labor and capi-
tal in the production of goods and services, with “easy” here meaning “at 
low cost.” If replacing labor with capital is easy, the rate of return on capital 
(r) does not drastically decrease. If owners of capital can keep saving and 
investing large sums without reducing r too much, then the process of capi-
tal deepening will not reduce r that much and the inequality r > g will con-
tinue to hold—with all of the negatives Piketty’s book identifies. 
                                                                                                                           
 114 CHARLES R. HULTEN, THE MEASUREMENT OF CAPITAL 119 (Ernst R. Berndt & Jack E. 
Triplett eds., 1991) (noting that “[f]rom Karl Marx to the Cambridge controversies, there has been 
an ongoing disagreement among economists as to what capital is and how it should be meas-
ured”). 
 115 WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 
250–53 (3d ed. 1985); PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 216. 
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As evidence that r does not fall that much when the wealthy save and 
invest more and more wealth, Piketty cites the fact that historically the 
share of wealth going to capital (instead of labor) has not decreased when 
capital deepening has occurred.116 This implies that r must not fall that 
much when K increases; if it did, the share of national income accruing to 
capital would decline. He argues that “[i]ntuitively, this corresponds to a 
situation in which there are many different uses for capital in the long run. 
Indeed, the observed historical evolutions suggest that it is always possi-
ble—up to a certain point, at least—to find new and useful things to do with 
capital.”117 If this is correct, then reductions in r due to capital deepening 
will not be significant enough to undo r > g and the associated social harms. 
The second question (“Isn’t more capital always a good thing?”) taps 
into deeply held mores embracing thrift: saving is better than consuming. 
Illustrations abound throughout history, from biblical morality tales118 to 
children’s fables119 to Horatio Alger’s fictitious embodiments of the Ameri-
can Dream in his novels about upwardly-mobile young lads at the dawn of 
America’s Gilded Age.120 There are multiple motivations for this preference 
for parsimony, but a primary one is that savings can be invested in produc-
tive projects that enable more consumption over time.121 Further, building 
on this argument, wealthy investors can argue that their frugality raises la-
bor incomes based on the conventional and widely-held belief that increas-
ing the amount of capital per worker raises wages.122 This is an instance in 
which trickle-down economics might actually work.123 
                                                                                                                           
 116 PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 216. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See Luke 15:11–:32 (noting the famed Parable of the Prodigal Son, in which one son saves 
and the other spends foolishly). 
 119 Æsop, The Ants and the Grasshopper, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://read.gov/aesop/052.html 
[https://perma.cc/H9BZ-7AZR] (noting the moral: “There’s a time for work and a time for play.”). 
 120 See generally HORATIO ALGER, MARK THE MATCH BOY (1869); HORATIO ALGER, RAG-
GED DICK (1868); HORATIO ALGER, STRUGGLING UPWARD (1868). 
 121 See OLIVIER BLANCHARD, MACROECONOMICS 56–57 (5th ed. 2009). 
 122 See NICHOLSON, supra note 115, at 490–98 (illustrating that prevailing neoclassical econom-
ic theory maintains that the wage is determined by the marginal product of labor, and injecting more 
capital per worker into the production process is assumed to make laborers more productive). 
 123 See Trickle-down Theory, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/trickle-down%20theory [https://perma.cc/A8MT-AEFP] (stating that trickle-down economic 
theory “suggests that a policy of tax cuts and other financial benefits to businesses and rich individu-
als will indirectly benefit the broader and poor population”). There is a large body of evidence that 
tax cuts for the wealthy do not provide trickle-down benefits for less-affluent households. See gener-
ally Martin Feldstein & Douglas W. Elmendorf, Budget Deficits, Tax Incentives, and Inflation: A 
Surprising Lesson from the 1983–1984 Recovery, in 3 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1 (Lawrence 
H. Summers ed., 1989), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10943.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XN8-KMME] 
(providing data from the 1980s making that argument); Danny Yagan, Capital Tax Reform and the 
Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 3531 (2015) 
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Although Piketty does not address this question, there are a number of 
rebuttals. First, although capital deepening does raise the level of national 
income, it does not raise the long-term growth rate of the economy due to 
diminishing returns that inevitably set in as an economy deploys more and 
more of the same old capital.124 Thus the benefits of pure capital accumula-
tion are less lasting than many believe. Moreover, the growing income ine-
quality that has accompanied the explosive growth of wealth inequality 
since the 1970s seriously brings into question the hope that capital deepen-
ing benefits most workers.125 This may be due to the changing nature of 
capital and what has been dubbed “skill-biased technological change,” but 
this is beyond the scope of this Article.126 Investment today no longer con-
sists of machines that make lower-skilled laborers more productive. It con-
sists of computers, patents, copyrights, and other investments that may en-
hance the productivity of a relatively small slice of workers at the top of the 
income distribution—hence rising incomes in the top 1–10% and stagnation 
for the median worker.127 There is simply no evidence that capital deepen-
ing has raised lower- or middle-class incomes in the twenty-first century. 
This type of trickle-down economics simply is not working. 
A second rebuttal to the notion that more capital is always better is the 
Keynesian idea of the “paradox of thrift:” if too much income is saved in 
ways that do not fund investment expenditures, there is a shortfall in aggre-
gate demand and the economy slumps.128 In the long run there may be plen-
                                                                                                                           
(making that argument). On the trickle-down benefits of consumption expenditures by the wealthy, 
see infra notes 233–239 and accompanying text. 
 124 This, again, is the fundamental insight of Solow, supra note 112. 
 125 There is now an enormous literature on growing income and wealth inequality. In addition to 
Piketty’s book, other seminal contributions include: CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, GROWING DISPARITIES 
IN LIFE EXPECTANCY (2008), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/
 reports/04-17-lifeexpectancy_brief.pdf [https://perma .cc/C7QU-JX4S] (discussing life-expectancy 
inequality); Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the 
Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY? RISING INEQUALITY, 
SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES 91 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011) 
(discussing educational inequality); Cagetti & De Nardi, supra note 62 (discussing wealth inequali-
ty); Raj Chetty et al., Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergenera-
tional Mobility, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 141 (2017) (discussing socioeconomic mobility); and Piketty & 
Saez, supra note 78 (discussing income inequality). 
 126 For a discussion of this topic, see generally, for example, David Autor et al., The Skill 
Content of Recent Technical Change: An Empirical Exploration, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1279 (2003); 
Claudia Goldin & Lawrence Katz, The Origins of Technology-Skill Complementarity, 113 Q.J. 
ECON. 693 (1998). 
 127 See, e.g., Thomas Piketty et al., Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for 
the United States (Wash. Ctr. for Equitable Growth, Working Paper, 2016), http://equitablegrowth.
org/working-papers/distributional-national-accounts/ [https://perma.cc/Q4RV-MF43] (explaining 
how increased capital income for the top one percent reinforces wealth inequality). 
 128 See infra notes 242–265 and accompanying text. 
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tiful opportunities for profitable investment as Piketty suggests,129 but any 
temporary failure of the pipeline pumping savings into investment can 
cause recessions and even depressions. The higher the savings rate, the 
greater the potential for a savings-investment disconnect to send the econ-
omy into a tailspin, and the savings rates required to fund dynastic wealth 
are extremely high by historical standards.130 We return to this issue in 
Part IV, Section B.131 
Finally, there is an equitable rebuttal to the idea that everyone benefits 
from greater saving and investing by the wealthy: why exactly is it that a 
very small fraction of the population possesses such a disproportionate 
share of society’s productive capital? This of course raises difficult, com-
plex questions about the interplay of incentives and fairness.132 If a society 
places any weight on division of the pie in tandem with the size of the pie 
these questions cannot be avoided. Implicit in Piketty’s work is the notion 
that inheritance is ground zero in the creation of inequality and its propaga-
tion across generations; thus, laws about inheritance are ground zero in ad-
dressing the foreboding return to a world of r > g. 
II. LEGAL CHANGE ENABLING PERPETUAL FAMILY (DYNASTIC) TRUSTS 
That legal ground zero has witnessed a full-fledged rout of reasoned 
opposition to the return of dynastic wealth. This Section documents the two 
recent developments in the law of inheritance at the heart of this rout of rea-
son. The timing of this misadventure could hardly be worse. As Piketty and 
others were raising the alarm about the return of dynastic family wealth, 
American state legislatures and the federal Congress were dismantling the 
relatively modest anti-feudal legal rules that would to some extent mitigate 
the negative dynamics of r > g. We turn first to the virtual disappearance of 
the centuries-old Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP), and then examine the 
continuing determined assault on the estate tax. 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 216. 
 130 See supra notes 100–102 (describing example of dynastic wealth creator saving ninety 
percent of capital income). 
 131 See infra notes 233–239 and accompanying text. 
 132 For a classic overview of these tensions, see generally ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND 
EFFICIENCY, THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975). 
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A. Dynasties Rising I: The Demise of the Rule Against Perpetuities 
Although the Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) itself is “only” about 
325 years old,133 its roots in the English common law go back much further, 
almost to the Norman Invasion in 1066. Much to the embarrassment of nat-
ural rights theorists, there was actually no right to inherit in the decades 
after 1066—for example, on the death of a loyal baron, the king had the 
right to install an ally bearing no relation to the decedent as lord of an es-
tate.134 The nobility of course lobbied intensively for the right to pass their 
estates on to their progeny and eventually succeeded.135 
Indeed, in 1285 they not only won the right to bequeath their estates, 
but also by statute gained the right to create a “fee tail.”136 This estate dic-
tated that successive donees of an estate (usually the oldest male child under 
primogeniture) enjoyed what amounted to a life estate. Each took posses-
sion and collected all income from the land (for example, rents; sale of cut 
lumber) as long as he lived but could not sell, mortgage, or in any way 
erode its value—thus each succeeding eldest son had a right to inherit an 
estate of undiminished value.137 
This chain of life estates continued indefinitely and was an early type 
of perpetuity. Judges looked with disfavor on the fee tail, as it made for dis-
obedient children and made land inalienable: any sale by the current owner, 
even if joined by his eldest son and eldest grandson, could not bind later 
generations of unborn rights holders. Thus, the English judiciary, in a series 
of decisions, created complex legal mechanisms by which the possessor of a 
fee tail could convert his life estate into full ownership (“fee simple”).138 
                                                                                                                           
 133 The birth of the RAP is usually identified with the holding in The Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 
22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682), discussed infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 134 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71–72; 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & WIL-
LIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 329 
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INTERESTS 28–34 (2d ed. 1984). 
 138 The decisive precedent was Taltarum’s Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. 4, 19 (1472), which enabled a 
possessor in fee tail to erase the rights of future generations (“bar the entail”) by a legal action 
called a common recovery. For all of the complex details and fictions involved in a common re-
covery, see A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 86–94 (2d ed., Clarendon Press, 
1986). 
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The urge to create dynastic wealth remained quite powerful and in the 
1500s clever scriveners working for the British nobility developed increas-
ingly complicated wills designed to mimic the fee tail in preserving family 
estates by preventing all successors to title from selling, mortgaging, or oth-
erwise disinheriting subsequent generations of the bloodline.139 The ever-
vigilant English judiciary remained implacably opposed to perpetuities in 
any and all guises. In a series of cases culminating in the famous The Duke 
of Norfolk’s Case,140 judges crafted the RAP as a general rule to limit the 
extent of “dead-hand control” that donors could exercise after gifting or 
bequeathing their property.141 
The RAP itself is deceptively simple: “No interest is good unless it 
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at 
the creation of the interest.”142 Within these seemingly innocent twenty-
seven words lurk intricacies that have tortured law students, practicing at-
torneys, and judges for generations.143 The meaning of “vest” is not intui-
tive,144 and figuring out whether there is a suitable “life in being” can be 
quite vexing.145 For the purposes of this Article there is no need to under-
stand all of the subterranean complexities of the RAP. The basic idea is 
simple: in her will, a testator can impose conditions and limitations for a 
period not exceeding the life of some living persons (usually children or 
grandchildren) plus twenty-one additional years. After that period, all con-
ditions must be resolved and all limitations must end. In the most typical 
case of gifts to succeeding generations, the RAP means that a testator can 
maintain dead-hand control of her property until twenty-one years after the 
death of her last child. 
We will discuss policy justifications for the RAP in Part IV,146 but mere-
ly note here that the RAP achieved the judiciary’s goal of insuring marketa-
                                                                                                                           
 139 GRAY, supra note 1, §§ 141c–141f. 
 140 The Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931. 
 141 GRAY, supra note 1, § 156. 
 142 Id. § 201. 
 143 For perhaps the most famous articles on the intricacies of the RAP, see generally W. Bar-
ton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1938); and W. Barton Leach, Perpe-
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 144 GRAY, supra note 1, §§ 205–210, at 176–83. 
 145 Id. at 192–96. 
 146 See infra notes 222–294 and accompanying text. 
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bility of land in seventeenth century England.147 The RAP required the reso-
lution of all uncertainty about the identity of interest holders within a some-
what variable but clearly bounded time period. This ensured that at some 
point the owner(s) could sell the property to a higher-value user, such as a 
more efficient farmer, or someone planning to convert wheat fields into sheep 
pastures. Thus, for centuries judges constructed and enforced the RAP and its 
predecessors to enhance the efficiency of the British economy by preserving 
the alienability of land, the key asset in an agricultural economy. 
It took centuries to shape the RAP and fend off continual efforts by 
wealthy families and their lawyers to find loopholes. It has taken state legis-
latures only a couple of decades to essentially erase this handiwork. No 
principled public purpose motivated lawmakers. To the contrary, they seem-
ingly gutted the RAP for no better reason than the proverbial thirty pieces of 
silver:148 to help their domestic banks attract trust fund business. Prior 
scholarship has described the process carefully and comprehensively,149 and 
so this Article tersely summarizes the death of the RAP.150 
Perhaps surprisingly, the end of the RAP began with a seemingly be-
nign change to the federal tax code. In 1986, Congress enacted the “Genera-
tion Skipping Transfer” (“GST”) tax to close a loophole that enabled fami-
lies with large fortunes to avoid payment of the federal estate tax (levied on 
relatively large property holders on their death) by granting life estates to 
one or more generations of a testator’s descendants.151 The key provision 
for our purposes is an exemption that permits donors to create trusts exempt 
                                                                                                                           
 147 Frederick Vierling, The Rule Against Perpetuities Applied to Trusts, 9 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 
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 149 See generally, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 
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 150 Piketty alludes to the existence of the RAP, but seems unaware of its demise. See PIKETTY, 
supra note 11, at 363. 
 151 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2663 (2012); see also Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, 
Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 
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from the GST.152 The federal tax code imposes no limit on the duration of 
this trust. Why? “When Congress enacted the GST tax, it probably assumed 
that most states would continue to adhere to the Rule against Perpetuities in 
one or another variation . . . .”153 That assumption was misguided. The GST 
exemption enabled donors to create trusts perpetually free from federal es-
tate and gift taxation.154  
Meanwhile, South Dakota was at the vanguard of a movement to at-
tract wealth management business by enacting laws favorable to big banks, 
other asset managers, and their customers.155 As part of this effort, the state 
abolished its RAP in 1983. When in 1986 the federal government created 
the GST exemption, the table was set for donors wishing to create sizeable 
dynastic trusts. Other states perceived that there was demand to establish 
such perpetuities. Delaware repealed its RAP in 1995,156 and Alaska in 
1997.157 By 2011 over half the states had either abolished the RAP or 
lengthened the period of dead-hand control to hundreds or even thousands 
of years—abolition for all practical purposes.158 Given the ease with which 
donors can (i) establish trusts outside of their state of domicile, and (ii) 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See 26 U.S.C. § 2631. 
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note 149, at 2101–02. 
 156 See 25 DEL. CODE ANN. § 503 (2009). Delaware does require that trusts dispose of land 
110 years after acquisition. Id. § 503(b). 
 157 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.27.051–.053 (2016). For technical tax reasons, Alaska signifi-
cantly revised its repeal statute in 2000. Id; see also Sterk, supra note 149, at 2101–02. 
 158 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS, ch. 27, 
intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (listing twenty-five states). To the twenty-five states listed in 
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STAT. ANN. § 14–2901 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-1102.5 (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 525-
4(6) (2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2018). 
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choose the law of any state to govern the trust,159 a surviving state RAP 
poses almost no hurdle for donors interested in creating perpetual dynasty 
trusts. As half of the states either abolished or severely diluted their RAPs, 
the Rule is effectively dead. 
Professors Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach cogently summarize 
what transpired: “[a]lthough neither the federal wealth transfer taxes nor the 
interstate competition for trust funds relates to the policies underpinning the 
Rule, together they have mortally wounded the Rule by reducing it to a 
mere transaction cost.”160 They further note that “[o]utright abolition repre-
sents a stark departure from a longstanding principle of Anglo-American 
common law. Yet there has been little or no debate on the merits of the Rule 
in the state legislatures that have abolished it.”161 Based on sophisticated 
empirical work they conclude that it was very much worth the effort for 
these states’ trust industries, finding “that through 2003, the movement to 
abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities has affected the situs of $100 billion 
in reported trust assets—roughly 10% of the 2003 total.”162 
Parsing the evidence, Sitkoff and Schanzenbach believe that federal es-
tate tax planning rather than the desire for dynastic wealth is the driving 
force behind the movement of trusts to states abolishing or eviscerating 
their RAPs.163 Although this may have been the case, Dobris, writing rela-
tively early in the process of RAP’s demise, saw dynastic urges coming to 
the fore.164 Moreover, Piketty’s argument suggests that we are indeed mov-
ing towards a world in which r > g may dramatically increase the demand 
for dynastic family wealth.165 The RAP no longer stands in the way. 
B. Dynasties Rising II: The Fading Estate Tax 
As matters stand, the GST exemption and the death of the RAP mean 
that wealthy testators can create perpetual trusts of at least $11.2 million 
dollars, and more with sophisticated estate planning tools like life insurance 
                                                                                                                           
 159 UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 107, 403 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). See generally Eugene F. 
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 160 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 9, at 362. 
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policies.166 Although by no means peanuts, this is but a small portion of es-
tates containing assets worth hundreds of millions or billions of dollars. 
Despite dramatic reductions in the major tax reform bill enacted at the 
end of 2017,167 the federal estate and gift tax regime168 still imposes a sig-
nificant tax levy on the largest estates,169 with a top marginal rate of 40% 
applied to the value of estates in excess of $11.2 million.170 Although this 
legislation doubled the already generous $5.5 million exemption, the estate 
tax survived as an effective tool against the creation of dynastic wealth by 
billionaires and hundred-millionaires. Its survival, however, is far from cer-
tain. The House version of the 2017 tax bill would have eliminated the es-
tate and gift tax entirely, and powerful forces continue their campaign to 
achieve that end.171 
By taking a major bite out of the largest estates, the current estate and 
gift tax serves as a significant counterweight to the intergenerational snow-
balling accumulation of large dynasty trusts that occurs naturally when r > 
g. Indeed, the federal estate and gift tax almost assuredly is a more potent 
weapon against the rise of a new aristocracy than the RAP. Politically, the 
federal estate and gift tax has been on the verge of extinction since the late 
1990s and remains the target of powerful, wealthy interests. As with the 
completed demise of the RAP outlined in the previous Section, it is hard to 
imagine a worse juncture at which to reduce or eliminate the estate tax giv-
en the metastasizing role that inherited wealth is playing as r > g reasserts 
itself in the twenty-first century. 
The story of how the federal estate and gift tax has been eviscerated 
and remains on the verge of elimination since the 1990s is intricate. We 
highlight those elements relevant to this Article.172 In the early 1990s, a 
small group of conservative activists began a campaign to abolish the estate 
and gift tax.173 Behind the scenes lurked a very small coterie of extremely 
wealthy families (collective wealth of nearly $200 billion) who since the 
1990s have spent nearly half a billion dollars on a host of repeal efforts.174 
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They have pushed the estate tax to brink on more than one occasion and 
they are not going away. 
These financiers of the movement to abolish the most progressive tax 
in America (applying to only the wealthiest 2%) do not base their campaign 
on the merits of living off hefty trust funds. Rather, their most oft-repeated 
and successful arguments revolve around assertions that payment of the es-
tate tax forced too many heirs to sell family farms or businesses in order to 
satisfy an onerous tax bill.175 The only problem with these assertions is that 
they are demonstrably false. According to the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities:  
[O]nly 80 small business and farm estates nationwide will owe 
any estate tax in 2009. This figure represents only 0.003 percent 
of all estates—that is, the estates of three out of every 100,000 
people who die this year. . . . The 80 small farm and business es-
tates left by people who die in 2009 that will owe any estate tax 
will owe the tax at an average rate of just 14 percent.176 
There was nothing special about 2009. Despite endless stories of families 
forced off their patrimonial farm by the estate tax, “the repeal opponents 
could not give the New York Times a legitimate account of a family that 
had to sell its farm in order to pay its estate tax.”177 Much the same was also 
true of tall tales about forced sales of family businesses to pay estate tax 
bills.178 
Indeed, farmers and small business owners are strange bedfellows for 
America’s wealthiest families. The abolition coalition has refused to con-
sider compromises that would have raised the minimum size of estates 
taxed to levels that would virtually guarantee that no farmer and very few 
business owners would pay a cent in estate tax. Such an increase in the ex-
emption amount would have done little for the ultra-wealthy families fund-
ing the campaign. This led Graetz and Shapiro to speculate that “the farmers 
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and small businesses were stalking horses for the billionaires and hundred-
millionaires who, with their massive portfolio wealth, pulled strings from 
behind the scenes . . . .”179 They concede that they lacked “the smoking gun 
that would prove [this],”180 but their suspicions seem well-founded. 
When Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush took office 
in 2000, his party controlled both houses of Congress, enabling him to pass 
a massive tax cut that included an apparent abolition of the federal estate 
and gift tax. The Republicans lacked the votes in the Senate to get around 
some obscure procedures for fiscal measures that might increase the deficit, 
and so had to settle for a bizarre provision that reduced the tax from 2001–
2009, eliminated it for 2010, but then restored it to its pre-repeal level in 
2011 and thereafter!181 Although Bush and congressional Republicans clear-
ly hoped to eventually make the repeal permanent, they never mustered the 
votes.182 Under Democratic President Barak Obama, the certainty of a veto 
that could not be overridden rendered the campaign to permanently abolish 
the estate tax nugatory.183 
With Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump’s victory in 
2016, along with Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, the 
federal estate and gift tax looked like a dead man walking. Trump had 
pledged to abolish it. 
We are going to repeal the death tax. The threat of being hit by 
the death tax leads small business owners and farmers in this 
country to waste countless hours and resources on complicated 
estate planning to make sure their children aren’t hit with a huge 
tax when they die. No one wants their children to have to sell the 
family business to pay an unfair tax.184 
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Trump and other advocates of repeal continued to cite the same disinfor-
mation (“alternative facts”?)185 despite its known falsity. Notwithstanding 
the support of the President and congressional majorities, the estate tax sur-
vived by the slimmest of margins.186 
If the vast majority of Republican officeholders, continually prodded 
by very wealthy families, do eventually succeed in repealing the estate tax, 
then for the first time since the Gilded Age, family wealth will pass from 
generation to generation undiminished. This of course will significantly 
strengthen the dynasty-reinforcing dynamics of r > g. As with the RAP, it is 
harder to imagine a less auspicious time to abolish taxation of inherited 
wealth.187 Even more sobering, it is hard to imagine a story that more vivid-
ly illustrates the influence that concentrated wealth can have on lawmaking 
in a democracy. A small circle of wealthy families, through a persistent 
campaign of misinformation, have managed to convince many farmers, 
family restaurant owners, and others of relatively limited means that the 
federal government is going to take half of their modest wealth when they 
die despite the fact that the current estate tax applies only to multi-
millionaires—far fewer than 1% of Americans.188 Piketty counsels us that 
inherited wealth is ‘just getting started’ and will balloon this century based 
on the cumulative effects of r > g. Justice Brandeis was no alarmist to de-
clare that “[w]e can have democracy in this country, or we can have great 
wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both.”189 
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III. THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF DYNASTIC WEALTH: PIKETTY’S “NEW  
MATH” FOR DYNASTIC WEALTH (r > g WRIT SMALL) 
A significant body of scholarship argues that we need not be concerned 
about attempts to create perpetual dynastic wealth because even if the 
wealthy desire to found dynasties, and even if existing legal rules permit 
them to do so, their efforts will inevitably fail. The most important argu-
ment raised by these ‘naysayers’ is Malthusian in that it centers on the way 
that geometrically expanding numbers of beneficiaries inevitably frustrate 
attempts to establish dynastic family wealth.190 Turnier and Harrison color-
fully label this the “ever-growing army of surviving descendants.”191 Wag-
goner, a true giant in the field of future interests and perpetuities, elaborates. 
Under some reasonable assumptions,192 he calculates that “[o]ne hundred 
and fifty years after creation, a perpetual trust could have about 450 living 
beneficiaries; after 250 years, more than 7,000 living beneficiaries; after 
350 years, about 114,500 living beneficiaries. This means that 350 years 
after creation, Michigan Stadium or the Rose Bowl would not be large 
enough to hold them all.”193 
The implications for attempts to establish dynastic wealth seem clear: 
after a relatively modest number of generations, the inevitable result is “a 
trust that disgorge[s] essentially nothing to a massive number of beneficiar-
ies, with all of the income of the trust being used in trust administration.”194 
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to overuse and underuse by multiple owners); and Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 149, at 1339 
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This is no donor’s vision of a successful dynastic bloodline that will project 
familial wealth and power into the future unendingly. 
However, the extended example in Part I, Section C above195 reveals 
that this focus on geometrically expanding population in isolation ignores 
the undeniable fact that wealth also grows geometrically. Indeed, “com-
pounded return” is a synonym for geometric growth.196 In other words, hu-
mans are fruitful, but so too is wealth. Some scholars have noted this in 
passing without wrestling with the implications.197 Those who have failed to 
account for geometrically growing wealth did not have the benefit of Piket-
ty’s work on the long history of relatively high rates of return; for that rea-
son, they generally assumed, per prior common wisdom, that wealth grows 
at anomalously low rates. Shepard, for example, assumes that wealth grows 
at a real rate of 3%, which is well below the 5–6% rates that Piketty shows 
to have been typical in most eras for which data is available.198 This over-
sight severely undermines his conclusion that perpetual dynastic trusts 
“would inevitably, eventually, result in a trust that disgorged essentially 
nothing to a massive number of beneficiaries, with all of the income of the 
trust being used in trust administration.”199 In short, the Malthusians either 
ignore entirely the fact that wealth grows geometrically or impute far too 
low a rate of return. 
The following calculations distill the essence of the competition be-
tween the growing body of descendants receiving benefits from a trust and 
the growing value of the trust’s assets and the income it generates. Follow-
ing the best empirical work, we assume that the length of a generation is 
about 25 years200 and that each mother in a dynasty has two children.201 
This implies that the number of beneficiaries grows at about 2.8% a year.202 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text. 
 196 See Compound Return, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/compound
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With Pikettian annual real returns to capital of around 5.5%,203 it is immedi-
ately apparent that the Malthusian problem is illusory. A donor can require 
that her perpetual dynastic trust set aside 2.8% of income each year to cover 
expected growth in the class of beneficiaries, leaving 2.7% of the income 
for payouts to her descendants. 
Under these parameters, a donor can assure all of her descendants, for-
ever, a very comfortable annual income of $200,000204 by investing about 
$14.8 million dollars in a dynasty trust.205 This is not a trivial sum, but it is 
also not an extraordinary sum in this age of great wealth inequality. Someone 
dying with an estate of $75 million could fund $1 million-dollar annual in-
comes for all of her (expanding) set of descendants over an infinite hori-
zon.206 Finally, to consider an extreme example, Bill Gates, with reported 
wealth of about $81 billion, could create a dynasty trust that would assure 
each of his growing tree of descendants over $2 billion a year.207 That, by any 
definition, would be an example of grandiose, awesome dynastic wealth. 
Scholars spinning out scenarios of Malthusian proliferation of de-
scendants can be forgiven for being intellectually blinded by the historically 
exceptional economic conditions of the twentieth century.208 Having lived 
their entire lives during a period of unusually high growth (g) and some-
what depressed rates of return (r), the math outlined in the prior paragraphs 
seems implausible. Turnier and Harrison, for example, observe that a donor 
trying to establish a perpetual dynastic trust must contribute funds sufficient 
not only to keep up with the growing body of beneficiaries but also with 
income growth (g) in the range of 5%.209 As Piketty has shown, however, 
the national income growth rates approaching 5% enjoyed during the “Glo-
                                                                                                                           
 203 See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. The choice of 5.5% is based on the histori-
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standards of living). 
 209 See Turnier & Harrison, supra note 16, at 797. 
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rious Thirty Years” from 1946–1975 are historically quite atypical and un-
likely to recur.210 Going forward, in a world of low g, insuring that a “fami-
ly’s relative standard of living in the larger society—‘keeping up with the 
Joneses’”211 will require real annual income increases on the order of 1–2% 
as opposed to 4–5%. 
Those raising the Malthusian argument cite other factors to buttress their 
case that dynasty trusts are infeasible, one of which has merit. This factor is 
that life expectancies are increasing, which implies that funding dynasty 
trusts will become more expensive.212 With each generation living longer, 
there will on average be more beneficiaries to support at a given time. That 
said, longevity is increasing at a very slow rate. Between 2005 and 2015, life 
expectancy for all Americans rose only slightly over a year, from 77.6 to 78.8 
years, and has been essentially flat since 2010.213 With such small gains in 
longevity, it will take a century or more until dynastic trusts have significantly 
more beneficiaries to support due to increasing life spans. 
Comparatively, other factors raised as barriers to funding dynastic 
trusts have no real bite. Inflation poses no threat to dynastic trusts as the 
value of and return on investments in ‘real assets’ like real estate, stocks, 
and intellectual property should naturally keep up with inflation.214 Man-
agement fees ranging up to 2% can put a real crimp on the maintenance of 
dynastic wealth,215 but informed donors will know that money managers 
rarely beat market index funds.216 Management fees on simple index funds 
containing a portfolio with large numbers of stocks, bonds, and other assets 
                                                                                                                           
 210 See supra Figure 2 & note 45. 
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are fractions of 1%.217 Such low transaction costs pose essentially no threat 
to the viability of dynastic trusts. 
Taxation, however, does have a material, adverse effect on making 
trust assets grow in tandem with the number of beneficiaries. In particular, 
trust income retained and added to the trust res is taxable.218 Most dividends 
(“qualified dividends”) are taxed at lower rates than ordinary income.219 
Capital gains are taxable only on the sale of assets, and a trust holding a 
well-diversified portfolio of assets has no need to sell any of its holdings. In 
addition, the tax rate on long-term capital gains is much lower than the rate 
on ordinary income.220 
The estate tax is the last barrier standing in the way of perpetual family 
fortunes. With a top marginal rate of 40%221 on principal (not just annual 
income) applied once a generation (that is, about once every 25 years), the 
estate tax makes maintaining true dynastic wealth difficult if not impossible. 
In its absence, the bottom line is that other taxes do not seriously affect the 
basic math implied by Piketty’s r > g: if, as seems quite possible, the estate 
tax is eliminated in the near future, creating dynastic trusts will be econom-
ically feasible for wealthy donors. 
IV. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REGULATING DEAD-HAND CONTROL 
We have reached a juncture at which potentially unlimited dynastic 
family trusts (perpetuities) may grow without bounds primarily due to high 
trust savings rates and compounded returns. Not only are such trusts now 
legal, but per Pikettian economics, they have the potential to usher in a new 
class of rentier families enjoying high incomes spun off from dynastic trusts 
for generations on end in an r > g world. Should we simply accept the return 
of dynastic family wealth as a natural social outcome? This Section argues 
in the negative, offering novel grounds to justify laws to curb dynastic 
wealth. Section A begins by summarizing traditional arguments against 
dead-hand control along with powerful critiques of these arguments raised 
in recent scholarship. Section B then summarizes compelling but contested 
                                                                                                                           
 217 For example, the Schwab S&P 500 fund has an annual expense ratio of 0.04%; the Fidelity 
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normative political arguments against dynastic wealth. Finally, in this Arti-
cle’s primary contribution, I offer novel positive economic justifications for 
adopting policies against perpetual family wealth: the dangers posed by 
dead-hand control of the savings rate in both the short and the long run, and 
the counterintuitive equality-fostering benefits of prodigal heirs. 
A. Crumbling Foundations of Traditional Arguments Against  
Dead-Hand Control 
Historically, the primary objection to locking wealth in families for 
generations without end was that it made the most important asset in the 
medieval economy inalienable. Even in relatively primitive feudal societies, 
alienability of property is critical to maximizing social wealth.222 Sound 
economics requires channeling property to the person who values it the 
most. This is true for all goods but especially so for factors of production. In 
order to maximize output, the best farmers should do the farming, the best 
husbandmen should do the shepherding, and the best managers should over-
see estates. 
These considerations may well explain the hostility of common law 
judges to restraints on alienation in general and to perpetuities in particu-
lar.223 Lawyers for the English nobility designed the fee tail and similar 
conveyance tools to insure that the family estate stayed in the family. The 
probability that successive eldest male heirs in a family bloodline are the 
best managers of the estate is vanishingly small. Managing a large piece of 
property with multiple uses in a dynamic environment where optimal con-
tractual terms and land uses are evolving is no trivial matter. Nobles rou-
tinely hired agents to do much of the administration of their estates, but 
these ‘middle managers’ did not own the property and so lacked full incen-
tives to maximize the value of the estate.224 
In this environment, judicial opposition to perpetuities and creation of 
the Rule against them was a simple matter of sound social policy. Alienable 
                                                                                                                           
 222 Before their ancient script was decoded, scholars speculated that one of the large stone 
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been constructed as magic objects or as recordation of ancient religious rituals. But “[t]he result 
was far less exciting than they had expected: the inscription commemorates a land donation given 
by a father to his daughter as a dowry when she married an important official.” Susan Paulus, 
Kudurrus, Guardians of Property, ORIENTAL INST. OF THE UNIV. OF CHI.: NEWS & NOTES 4–6 
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land more readily flowed from inept management to skilled oversight, from 
farmers to sheepherders, or from agricultural to residential or industrial 
use.225 
Insuring alienability, however, no longer requires the RAP because of 
widespread use of trusts. Assets, be they land, patents, corporations, or any-
thing else, can be placed in trust.226 The trustee has both legal duties and 
economic incentives to maximize the value of the trust and so will tend to 
sell assets to the highest bidder—the essence of the free market approach to 
directing productive assets to those best able to manage them. Indeed, in 
England property divided between a life estate holder and a beneficiary of 
the remainder must be placed in a trust by law, insuring that disagreements 
between the life estate and remainder beneficiaries cannot render the land 
inalienable.227 If policymakers are solely concerned about alienability, the 
RAP is overkill. Simply requiring grantors to (i) place all property they 
wish to divide between present and future interest holders into a trust, and 
(ii) give the trustee full power to sell all assets, suffices to insure the power 
and the incentives to sell assets to highest-value users. 
Scholars in the twentieth century, realizing that fostering alienability 
no longer necessitated the RAP, offered instead a “balancing” justification 
for the Rule, a sort of compromise permitting grantors control over their 
assets for a limited time. As famously stated by Professor Lewis Simes, the 
leading future interests and RAP scholar of his generation. 
The Rule against Perpetuities strikes a fair balance between the 
desires of members of the present generation, and similar desires 
of succeeding generations, to do what they wish with the property 
which they enjoy . . . . The difficulty here is that, if we give free 
rein to the desires of one generation to create future interests, the 
members of succeeding generations will receive the property in a 
restricted state. They will thus be unable to create all the future 
interests they wish. Perhaps, they may not even be able to devise 
it at all. Hence, to come most nearly to satisfying the desires of 
peoples of all generations, we must strike a fair balance between 
unrestricted testamentary disposition of property by the present 
generation and unrestricted disposition by future generations.228 
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Simes’s balancing rationale for the RAP has long had its critics. Gal-
lanis questioned both its empirical basis and its utilitarian theoretical foun-
dations.229 In discussing the latter issue, he points out that there is no theo-
retical basis to believe that the RAP yields greater utility than either a total 
ban on restricted gifts at one end of the spectrum or permission for eternal 
restrictions at the other pole (where America is today).230 In a similar vein, a 
student note points out a peculiarity of the RAP: donors can choose to leave 
nothing to their heirs or everything to their heirs without restriction, so why 
deny intermediate choices that control ownership for many generations or 
forever? “Acceptance of either extreme but rejection of arrangements that 
fall in the middle seems an awfully strange way to achieve ‘balance.’”231 
Hirsch and Wang take these arguments to their logical conclusion and 
argue that as long as dynastic grantors employ trusts that give trustees a free 
rein, there is simply no problem with perpetual wealth in a bloodline. 
[W]hen a bequest incorporates broadly flexible provisions for in-
vestment and distribution . . . no clear justification for regulation 
appears. A trust of this sort should neither depress value nor foster 
arbitrariness; indeed, it can affirmatively benefit a family by 
providing its members with comprehensive insurance against 
need . . . . Arguably, lawmakers should permit discretionary fami-
ly trusts to persist, even in perpetuity.232 
As this discussion shows, the traditional arguments for forbidding perpetui-
ties have little current force. 
B. The Political Economy Case Against Dynastic Wealth 
Yet the assertion that dynastic wealth poses no costs or threats would 
be strange to America’s founding generation. Orth chronicles that: 
[w]hen the North Carolina General Assembly abolished entailment 
[that is, the fee tail, a type of perpetual family estate] in 1784, . . . it 
explained that “entails of estates tend only to raise the wealth and 
importance of particular families and individuals, giving them an 
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unequal and undue influence in a republic, and prove in manifold 
instances the source of great contention and injustice.”233 
Generalizing this point about the founding generation’s concern with the 
“undue” political influence that dynastic wealth might wield, Chester ob-
served that “[i]t would appear that the American fondness for dead-hand 
control as an extension of our individualism may be enabling the creation of 
the very aristocracy that our country originally rebelled against.”234 
In the first decades of the 1900s, when the nation enacted first an estate 
tax and then an income tax, politicians from both major parties, along with 
scholars, uniformly echoed this centuries-old concern. Repetti compiled the 
evidence including: Theodore Roosevelt stating that society needs to prevent 
“the owner of one of these enormous fortunes to hand more than [a] certain 
amount to any one individual.”235 Franklin Roosevelt, decades later, declared 
that large pools of dynastic wealth “amount to the perpetuation of great and 
undesirable concentration of control in a relatively few individuals over the 
employment and welfare of many, many others.”236 Irving Fischer, one of the 
greatest American economists of the early 1900s, and no wild-eyed radical, 
had a similar take, favoring an estate tax to guard against the “danger [that] 
hereditary plutocracy” poses to “democratic ideals.”237 
This Brandeisian belief that excessively concentrated wealth is incon-
sistent with democracy238 is not merely speculative. In addition to the long 
historical pedigree just limned, there is significant evidence of a positive cor-
relation between inequality and undemocratic governance.239 Even though 
both theory and evidence weigh heavily in favor of Brandeis’ contention 
that excessively concentrated wealth undermines democracy, the paramount 
reason to reduce economic inequality, this Article proceeds in a different 
direction. In particular, the following Section identifies the unnoticed costs 
imposed by dynastic wealth. All of these costs flow from the counterintui-
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tive but theoretically and empirically supported fact that too much saving 
can negatively impact the economy and hence most citizen’s welfare. These 
costs are incontrovertible and substantial. More importantly, these costs 
more than justify the normative measures advocated in Part V. 
C. The True Costs of Perpetuities: Economic Harms Resulting from the 
Dead-Hand Control of the Savings Rate 
Legal scholars analyzing perpetuities generally adhere to conventional 
wisdom and consequently view saving as an unmitigated good—‘the more 
the better.’ Hirsch and Wang, for example, justify permitting donors to exer-
cise perpetual control over the distribution of trust income based in part on 
their assertion that “intergenerational distribution restrictions . . . bring ben-
efits in the form of increased wealth conservation.”240 Elaborating, they go 
on to say that: 
Conservation of wealth is generally believed to avail society by 
contributing to long-term economic growth. Indeed, granting a 
testator the right to lengthen a chain of future interests encourages 
saving in two ways. Such a right contributes to the testator’s own 
incentive to save, even as it obligates her beneficiaries to follow 
suit. To the extent that intergenerational allocations inspire a 
higher rate of saving, they provide at least one public benefit 
. . . .241 
In Subsection 2 below we will disprove the assertion that savings always 
fuels long-term growth. First, however, we show that an excessively high 
savings rate can reduce national income in the short run via the “paradox of 
thrift.” 
1. The Paradox of Thrift 
Olivier Blanchard begins his explanation of the “paradox of thrift” by 
observing that although when “we grow up, we are told the virtues of 
thrift,” modern macroeconomic models tell “a different and surprising sto-
ry.”242 The “paradox of thrift” (or “paradox of saving”) is the label given to 
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the idea that “attempts by people to save more lead to both a decline in out-
put and to unchanged saving.”243 This idea is not complex. If everyone 
started stuffing most of their pay under their mattresses at home instead of 
spending it on consumption items at each other’s businesses, everyone 
would suffer a reduction in income.244 Krugman limns the process cogently: 
Suppose a large group of people decides to save more. You might 
think that this would necessarily mean a rise in national savings. 
But if falling consumption causes the economy to fall into a re-
cession, incomes will fall, and so will savings, other things equal. 
This induced fall in savings can largely or completely offset the 
initial rise.245 
If, instead of putting cash under their mattresses, people invested their 
savings in each other’s businesses, consumption would fall but investment 
would rise and the economy would be saved from a recession (a drop in 
income).246 In recessions, however, people tend to seek out very safe assets 
like treasury bills and bonds that are essentially cash as opposed to capital 
investment.247 This ultimately differs little from putting money under a mat-
tress, and causes disconnect between the increased desires to save with the 
unchanged investment on the other that at root explains recessions.248 
Krugman highlighted the continuing relevance of the paradox of thrift 
relatively early into the Great Recession. After observing that “the paradox 
of thrift is one of those Keynesian insights that largely dropped out of eco-
nomic discourse,”249 he rhetorically asked if it was “actually visible in the 
data? The answer is, and how!”250 Krugman highlighted the relevant eco-
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nomic statistics: the personal savings rate was rising while personal in-
comes continued to plummet and concluded that “it’s quite clear that we’re 
in serious paradox of thrift territory here.”251 Alluding to its short-run na-
ture, he conceded that “we won’t always face the paradox of thrift,” but 
immediately emphasized that “right now it’s very, very real.”252 
The case for classic Keynesian fiscal policy responses to economic 
downturns has strengthened as the Great Recession exhibited phenomena, 
like the paradox of thrift, that vindicated Keynesian Economics notions that 
had gone out of fashion.253 Fiscal policy generally means either increased 
governmental spending or tax cuts (or both) funded with debt—that is, defi-
cit spending.254 Government deficit spending directly increases demand for 
goods and services, thus giving the economy a boost.255 Perhaps more im-
portant are the secondary (and tertiary) effects of this spending, as those 
receiving payment from the government in turn spend a good portion of this 
money on private goods and services, these second-hand beneficiaries do 
the same, and so on.256 The stimulus from deficit spending thus reverberates 
through the economy in waves of spending. Tax cuts operate in a similar 
fashion, but the spending starts in the private sector as less-burdened tax-
payers use some of the proceeds of the tax cut on consumption and succes-
sive waves of purchases increase the demand for goods and services.257 
These successive waves of spending are called the multiplier effect of 
fiscal policy (spending or tax cuts). The key parameter summing up the effec-
tiveness of fiscal policy is the multiplier, which tells us how much each dollar 
of spending (or tax cut) increases national income. A multiplier of three, for 
example, means that each dollar of deficit spending raises national income by 
three dollars. Multipliers need not be greater than one and can even be zero or 
negative. This can happen if citizens react to increased government spending 
by spending less instead of more. One prominent argument, for example, pos-
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its that the multiplier is zero because taxpayers save instead of spend in reac-
tion to deficit spending in anticipation of higher tax bills in the future to pay 
off the debt.258 Empirical estimates of the fiscal multiplier, however, are rare-
ly negative and typically range from around 0.1 to 2.5.259 
Although a number of factors determine the multiplier,260 one of the 
most important parameters is the marginal propensity to save (MPS).261 
This parameter tells us, on average, what portion of an extra dollar in in-
come households will save. If the MPS is one, then households save every 
cent of extra income they receive. As is readily apparent, a MPS of one 
would insure that the multiplier for government deficit spending was no 
more than one: after the government makes its purchases, recipients simply 
stash away every last cent, robbing the economy of multiple waves of 
spending.262 At the other extreme, a MPS of zero implies an infinite multi-
plier (ignoring other limiting parameters): each dollar that the government 
spends gets re-spent again and again, without limit. Generalizing this story, 
the higher the MPS the lower the multiplier.263 
This brings us back to perpetuities and dynastic trusts. We have seen 
that maintaining dynastic trusts generation after generation requires very 
high savings rates out of investment income—rates up to ninety percent or 
more.264 This high savings rate means that fiscal multipliers will be much 
lower. When the government buys goods and services from firms, dividends 
paid on shares owned by dynastic trusts will be saved instead of spent—the 
root explanation for why higher savings rates reduce the multiplier. Similar-
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ly, funds freed up by tax cuts will not be spent. By raising the average econ-
omy-wide saving rate, dynastic trusts will reduce fiscal multipliers. This 
will enervate the power of fiscal stimulus to pull the economy out of reces-
sions. Although economists for decades believed that monetary policy alone 
could keep the economy on track, the Great Recession has undermined that 
conviction. Simply put, if excessive amounts of wealth end up in dynastic 
trusts, the higher savings rate will tend to attenuate the effect of fiscal poli-
cy measures and leave the government without sufficiently potent policy 
measures to shorten recessions and ameliorate the widespread, often acute 
financial distress that they visit on most of the population—with the great-
est pain felt by those at the bottom of economic ladder.265 
2. Reduction in Long-Term Rate of Consumption 
Although it cuts against the grain of previously discussed intuition and 
folklore,266 combating the paradox of thrift requires relatively short-term 
deviations from cultural biases in favor of saving. This fact might help vot-
ers and policymakers temporarily overcome predispositions and enact poli-
cies encouraging consumption that can end a recession and restore prosperi-
ty. By contrast, this subsection, examines an economic phenomenon that 
cuts much harder and deeper against traditional predispositions in favor of 
saving. It is a bedrock principle of modern growth theory that an excessive-
ly high savings rate permanently reduces consumption. Savings is but an 
instrument to enable greater total consumption over some sufficiently long 
horizon. Thus, a savings rate so high that it permanently reduces consump-
tion is another undesired paradox. 
The core reason that sustained excessive savings rates eventually re-
duce consumption is diminishing returns to investments made with all of 
those savings. The fundamental lesson of Solow’s growth model, one of 
“the workhorse models of macroeconomics,”267 is that as capital per worker 
increases, the added production (marginal productivity) from these invest-
ments gets smaller and smaller. If all workers are already paired with nine-
ty-nine machines, how much is left to gain by adding a hundredth machine 
for each? Past some point, capital investments yield so little in incremental 
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goods and services that society would be better off if instead of making the 
investment it had diverted the wealth to consumption. 
The savings rate that maximizes consumption is called the “golden 
rule” rate and is equal to the sum of the depreciation rate for capital (rough-
ly, the annual rate at which capital wears out) and the rate of growth of the 
population.268 We have already cited evidence that g is at most about 2–3% 
in developed economies.269 The depreciation rate for private capital in de-
veloped nations is around 11%.270 Thus the golden rule savings rate, to err 
on the high side, is at most around 15% but more likely 13% or 14%. 
The U.S. savings rate has bounced around in the range of 2.5–7.5% 
since the late 1990s, with an average of about 5%.271 As the nation is no-
where near the golden rule rate, over the long run saving more would in-
crease not only national income but consumption as well. Indeed, the gap is 
large: the savings rate would have to roughly triple to approach the golden 
rule rate. Savings rates have rarely if ever approached the golden rule level. 
During the 1970s the savings rate did average around 12.5% and spiked for 
a single month above 15%, but since then it has trended down to around 5% 
and since fluctuated around that level.272 It would seem that only extraordi-
nary change could threaten to lift the saving rate to the inefficiently high 
levels above the golden rule rate. 
Dynastic trusts may embody just such extraordinary change. We have 
shown that donors who are serious about setting up dynastic trusts must 
impose trust income savings rates of around 90% in perpetuity to maintain 
high real incomes for a growing body of descendants.273 The share of 
wealth owned by potential dynasts, defined as those in the top 1% of the 
wealth distribution, has been trending up: it now stands at about 34%.274 If 
Piketty is correct, this number has begun an upward trajectory towards 
60%.275 Capital’s share of national income has trended up to about 40% and 
Piketty’s work suggests that this could keep rising to at least 50% and per-
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haps higher.276 If we round out the picture by assuming that non-dynasts 
save only 5% of their income and that half of all those in the top 1% of the 
wealth distribution decide to establish dynastic trusts, we end up with a sav-
ings rate of 17%—significantly above the 15% “golden rule” rate.277 
It is important to stop and think about exactly what would be happen-
ing in this scenario. On top of the dramatic increase in inequality embodied 
in the concentration of wealth in the top 1% and the rising share of national 
income claimed by that capital, the desire of the privileged few to establish 
dynastic wealth would lead to a savings rate that reduced everyone’s con-
sumption indefinitely. This is exactly what happens when savings exceed 
the golden rule rate. Only part of this cost would be borne by the dynasts. 
They would also drag down the consumption level of the remaining 99%.278 
This is a very long-run phenomenon and the costs would be borne by gener-
ation after generation of the bottom 99%. 
3. In Praise of Dissipation 
The previous two subsections showed that the dead-hand directives to 
save most of the income generated by large pools of capital in dynastic trust 
will result in both long-term and short-term excessive savings. This subsec-
tion refocuses on the use of the principal—the capital itself—in those dy-
nastic trusts. Heirs to fortunes who are free of dead-hand dynasty-
preserving constraints have the ability to live lavishly and spend not just the 
income from their inheritances but also to sell off the assets as well. They 
can liquidate their stocks and bonds and spend the proceeds on second 
(third, fourth, et cetera?) mansions, opulent cars, and other luxuries. The 
relative rarity of family dynasties lasting more than a few generations sug-
gests that many heirs indeed do dissipate much of their wealth and leave their 
children with substantially diminished fortunes.279 This subsection argues that 
such dissipation of family fortunes can be a potent tool for breaking up dy-
nastic family wealth and increasing socioeconomic mobility. 
Undeniably, if policymakers employ the RAP purely as a tool to pre-
vent the formation of dynastic wealth they are banking on the fact that some 
heirs will dissipate large parts of a donor’s largesse. If each generation in a 
long sequence of heirs is willing to forego lavish consumption and save 
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family trust income at a sufficiently high rate, they can establish a dynasty 
without the need for a single founding scion to mandate such behavior from 
beyond the grave. 
Shepard puts a common normative spin on this point, stating that “the 
RAP addresses the ‘problem’ of dynastic accumulations of wealth only, and 
only to the extent, that it diminishes overall social welfare by championing 
and facilitating the squandering or mal-investment of capital. Such a move 
is definitionally inefficient, and pretty patently unjust as well.”280 Shepard’s 
normative take is deeply rooted in the commonly-held view that more sav-
ing is always better—a position seriously undermined by the economic the-
ories brought to bear in the last two subsections.281 
Beyond the previously-discussed efficiency costs of over-saving, this 
Section emphasizes a separate equitable benefit of profligate heirs: the frit-
tering away of large inheritances on high living has a strong tendency to 
reduce income and wealth inequality. Unless prodigal heirs’ consumption 
preferences are quite odd, the beneficiaries of their spending will be a wide 
circle of common workers. For example, building a new mansion employs 
many laborers, including numerous relatively low-wage unskilled laborers. 
Buying a fancy new car translates into manufacturing jobs from assembly 
plants to parts makers to steel miners. Traveling in luxury increases the de-
mand for airline and hotel workers, tour guides, masseuses, and a host of 
other professions offering only modest wages. Luxury expenditures raise 
the demand for all of these forms of labor, thus expanding the number of 
jobs and putting upward pressure on wages.282 Dissipation of inherited 
wealth thus offers a form of trickle-down economics that likely works—not 
only to improve the welfare of the middle and lower classes but also to re-
duce overall inequality.283 
Piketty acknowledges that profligate heirs could reduce the concentra-
tion of wealth he is forecasting for the twenty-first century, but questions its 
impact. “It would in any case be rather imprudent to rely solely on the eter-
nal but arbitrary force of family degeneration to limit the future prolifera-
tion of billionaires.”284 He may, however, be underestimating the potency of 
wealth dissipation. Although there is scant hard data, what evidence we 
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have supports cross-cultural proverbs suggesting that family fortunes usual-
ly evaporate by the third generation.285 Data gathered by a firm that coun-
sels wealthy families on preserving their fortunes suggests that “70% of 
family wealth is destroyed by the second generation . . . . After three gen-
erations, the loss of wealth exceeds 90%.”286 The second number strongly 
supports the first in that it implies that each generation fritters away 70% of 
the legacy it receives.287 Piketty himself cites a large-scale historical epi-
sode providing further support for this “70%” rule, contrasting the large 
legacies left by French elite before World War I with the diminished sums 
left by wealthy decedents between the two world wars. He states: 
From 1872 to 1912, the system appears to have been perfectly 
balanced: the wealthiest individuals passed on to the next genera-
tion enough to finance a lifestyle requiring 80–100 times the av-
erage wage or even a bit more, so that wealth became even more 
concentrated. This equilibrium clearly broke down in the interwar 
years: the wealthiest 1 percent of Parisians continued to live more 
or less as they had always done but left the next generation just 
enough to yield capital income of 30–40 times the average wage; 
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by the late 1930s, this had fallen to just 20 times the average 
wage. For the rentiers, this was the beginning of the end. This was 
probably the most important reason for the deconcentration of 
wealth that we see in all European countries (and to a less extent 
in the United States) in the wake of the shocks of 1914–1945.288 
Note the approximately 70% reduction in inheritances across the two gener-
ations (pre-war, post-war). Piketty credits shocks from the First World War 
and the Great Depression for destroying wealth and depressing returns, but 
this episode may in part also be explained by the timeless phenomenon of 
“shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations.”289 
Whatever the ultimate explanation(s), maintaining dynastic wealth is 
apparently no mean feat. Prodigal children outnumber their frugal siblings 
by a margin of over two to one (seven to three based on sources cited in the 
previous paragraph).290 In order to counteract this tendency, wealth advisors 
recommend extensive surveys of family member desires, coaching to help 
families avoid conflict and work together to preserve wealth, assembling 
customized plans for wealth preservation based on a family’s characteristics 
and desires, and tutoring prospective heirs on the myriad difficulties of pre-
serving familial wealth.291 
These are expensive interventions, and even so there is no data show-
ing that in the end they reduce dissipation of family wealth. Preserving fam-
ily wealth is challenging when the baseline is that 70% of the beneficiaries 
in each generation would prefer to live it up. This difficulty brings into 
sharp relief the societal threat posed by permitting donors to fund perpetual 
dynastic trusts. In one fell swoop we are replacing a very leaky bucket of 
heirs (70% wish to dissipate) with the absolute iron dead hand of a donor 
dead set on preventing dissipation forever. We have for centuries lived with 
the RAP under which fortunes dissipated rapidly, and so we simply have no 
notion of how powerful the dead iron hand may be in preventing dissipa-
tion, concentrating wealth, and perpetuating privilege perpetually. 
As emphasized from the start, Piketty’s work suggests that this is a 
particularly inopportune time for licensing perpetual dynastic trusts.292 
Wealth is becoming increasing concentrated among a smaller and smaller 
group at the top of distribution.293 This small circle of extremely wealthy 
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households have the nine- , ten-, or eleven-figure wealth sufficient to pro-
vide lavish incomes to all of their descendants for generations on end—with 
no possibility of dissipation by even a single heir. One hundred years ago 
presidents, judges, academic economists, and very wealthy industrialists 
were convinced that such wealth was a malignant force inconsistent with 
democratic society.294 What can be done to prevent the formation of a new 
nobility encastled in perpetual wealth? 
V. TAXES ON PERPETUITIES (TOPS) INSTEAD OF A RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES (RAP) 
The traditional answer to this question, of course, has been the RAP 
and the estate tax. The RAP’s role as an anti-dynasty device dates back cen-
turies.295 Since its advent in 1916,296 the estate tax has buttressed the RAP 
in fending off dynastic impulses of the wealthy. 
[The estate tax] was meant to ward off the emergence of a heredi-
tary aristocracy in the United States. [It] was a populist response 
to the excesses of the Gilded Age. President Theodore Roosevelt 
pointed out that “most great civilized countries have an income 
tax and an inheritance tax.” Such taxation, he noted, should “be 
aimed merely at the inheritance or transmission in their entirety of 
those fortunes swollen beyond all healthy limits.”297 
Thus, the nation adopted the estate tax mainly to work in tandem with the 
RAP to prevent “fortunes swollen beyond all healthy limits” and the at-
tendant threats to democratic governance.298 
This Article has compellingly shown that perpetual dynastic trusts give 
rise to separate, severe, additional costs, costs that have heretofore gone 
unnoticed. As described in the Part IV, Section C above, perpetual family 
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trusts exacerbate the costs of concentrated wealth by raising the savings rate 
to inefficiently high levels and blocking desirable dissipation of family for-
tunes. These costs threaten to have a potent negative impact on the economy 
as a whole. 
In order to craft appropriate policy responses to the harms threatened 
by perpetuities, we first need to accurately conceptualize them. Specifically, 
the costs imposed by dynastic trusts are best understood as negative exter-
nalities: dynastic wealth benefits a small circle of affluent families, but 
those benefits are almost certainly swamped by longer and deeper reces-
sions and extended periods of stinted consumption due to the high savings 
rates required to sustain perpetual family wealth. Transactions costs based 
on the large number of parties on both sides makes any sort of private deal 
to eliminate the negative externality infeasible.299 
Because these costs are best conceived as externalities, regulations, be 
they the RAP or otherwise, are not the answer. The RAP itself is a dated, 
extremely blunt, and weakly targeted instrument to address the costs of ex-
cess savings. Alternative regulatory schemes could be devised to address 
negative externalities, but economists generally believe that taxation consti-
tutes the preferred policy tool. Specifically, they recommend taxing the un-
desirable activity at a rate that reflects the external costs imposed on socie-
ty.300 This achieves the efficient result by making the activity unprofitable 
for those who value it less than the tax while simultaneously raising revenue 
from those who value the activity sufficiently to pay the charge.301 This 
raises revenue for the government without any deadweight loss302—indeed, 
an externality tax raises revenue while improving incentives.303 
I therefore propose taxing perpetuities and moreover advocate that the 
tax be imposed by the national government. The last few decades have 
shown that the states are engaged in a serious race-to-the bottom304 in abol-
ishing the RAP. 305 It is essentially costless for decedents to choose the law 
of any jurisdiction to govern their estates,306 and so if even one state deregu-
lates perpetuities, then wealthy residents of all other jurisdictions can easily 
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establish a dynastic trust under cover of this state’s permissive law. States’ 
incentives to permit such trusts in order to attract trust business are power-
ful; as noted above, over half of the states have eviscerated or eliminated the 
RAP.307 The harm dynastic trusts pose do not respect state borders. They can 
cause both short- and long-term economic harm to the national economy and 
so to all citizens in all jurisdictions.308 Such interstate “spillover” effects are 
one of the primary policy justifications for federal intervention.309 
The paradox of thrift, savings in excess of the “golden rule” rate, and 
the absence of wealth dissipation are three distinct problems, and each calls 
for a distinct, narrowly-tailored federal solution.310 The bulk of this Section 
(Sections A through D) sketches taxes that would cure these negative exter-
nalities. First, we must explain why a tax is preferable to simply requiring 
dynasty trusts to make greater expenditures. 
A. Why Taxation Instead of Required Expenditures? 
The externalities in play here (adverse macroeconomic impacts of ex-
cessive saving) are unusual in that solving them does not require taxation. 
In more typical scenarios, such as a polluting factory, the owner emits con-
taminants because it is cheaper than any alternative (for example, filtration, 
or a different industrial process). In order to cure the externality, the gov-
ernment imposes a tax that forces polluters to factor the cost of their emis-
sions on others into their business decisions.311 
For dynasty trusts, the nature of the externality is fundamentally dif-
ferent. The problem is too much saving—equivalently, too little spending. 
The externality disappears if a trust grantor simply dictates more annual 
spending (less saving). Instead of a tax, then, the law could instead cure the 
excess saving externality by simply commanding the trustee to spend a 
greater share of trust income on something. It is not necessary to take value 
from the class of beneficiaries (that is, to tax them). Rather, all that is need-
ed is spending more trust income when excess saving either (i) exceeds the 
golden rule level or (ii) is causing a paradox of thrift. In the dynastic trust 
setting there is an alternative to a classic externality tax: a legal mandate 
requiring dynastic trusts to spend more when excessive saving reduces na-
tional income. 
                                                                                                                           
 307 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 308 See supra notes 240–294 and accompanying text. 
 309 Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An Issue of Federalism, 48 
OHIO ST. L.J. 503, 508 (1987) (asserting that national regulation is justifiable only to reduce spill-
over effects). 
 310 See supra notes 240–294 and accompanying text. 
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There is precedent for such a mandatory spending requirement on 
trusts: § 4942 of the federal tax code in effect requires that charitable trusts 
(“private foundations”) distribute at least 5% of their endowment to benefi-
ciaries.312 A trust pays an immediate 30% tax on any shortfall, and a 100% 
tax on the shortfall if not cured in ninety days.313 Such steep tax rates effec-
tively force foundations to spend 5% of their assets on beneficiaries. Admit-
tedly, the motivation for § 4942 bears no relation to the negative externali-
ties discussed herein. Section 4942 is “designed to prevent indefinite accu-
mulations of income without adequate justification.”314 
Of greater moment than this difference in purpose is the tremendous 
workability advantage that § 4942 possesses over any analogous provision 
for dynasty trusts. It is relatively easy to determine if a charity is making 
required expenditures for its class of beneficiaries. An education trust will 
be cutting paychecks to teachers or tuition checks to students. A charity for 
the hungry will be buying beef and barley and paying cooks to make soup. 
A cancer foundation will hire scientists and build labs. It is relatively easy 
for tax officials to determine whether or not private foundations are spend-
ing required amounts in furtherance of their charitable purposes. These sorts 
of trusts either (a) spend income on a relatively narrow class of goods or 
services or (b) they save it. 
The same cannot be said for dynastic trusts. In the face of a minimum 
expenditure requirement, a donor could insert all sorts of “spending” re-
quirements that in truth served the purpose of preserving and growing the 
capital of the trust. The trust document could, for example, direct forced ex-
penditures into real estate assets—second mansions for every beneficiary? 
Third, if necessary! Unoccupied properties could be rented out. Or a dynastic 
trust provision could direct required expenditures into precious gems and 
jewelry. Fine art work is another possibility. Gracefully aging wines anoth-
er. The point should be clear: there is a virtually endless list of mixed con-
sumption and saving goods the purchase of which does not stimulate de-
mand. The buyer of such assets (for they are assets) is generally not increas-
ing the demand for labor or capital; rather, she is exchanging one store of 
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wealth for another. The tax authorities could try to sort out the true “ex-
penditures” from the disguised saving, but the task seems impossible. 
Thus, in order to avoid the negative externalities that excess savings 
sometimes impose, the government needs to tax excess savings of dynastic 
trusts. Presumably the government will then spend the funds in any number 
of ways (for example, building or repairing public infrastructure; expanding 
government services) that do serve to alleviate saving in excess of the gold-
en rule rate or a paradox of thrift. We next consider when the government 
would need to impose such taxes, and how it would impose them. 
B. Taxing Dynastic Trust Savings in Excess of the Golden Rule Level 
I recommend a straightforward tax to counteract dynastic trust savings 
rates so extraordinarily high that they could pull the national savings rate 
above its “golden rule” level of approximately 15%.315 First, the tax need 
only apply to trusts that dictate a savings rate in excess of the golden rate. 
Trusts that save less are not part of the negative externality targeted by the 
tax. Second, the tax need not apply as long as the national savings rate re-
mains below the golden rule level. Until it exceeds that level, high dynastic 
trust savings rates do not depress consumption—the negative externality 
being targeted by the tax. 
If and when dynastic trust over-saving drives the national savings rate 
above the golden rule level, the tax rate on those trusts should be set such 
that the expected revenue from the tax equals the dollar level of over-
saving. To illustrate, assume as we did above that the golden rule rate for 
saving is 15% and that high rates of saving by dynastic trusts pull the econ-
omy’s savings rate up to 18%. If the national income were set at its 2016 
end-of-year value of $16.2 trillion dollars, dynasty trusts would be causing 
excess savings of about $500 billion dollars.316 The government can correct 
this by taxing all dynasty trusts saving more than 15% of their income at a 
rate designed to raise this $500 billion. For example, if the total dollar 
amount of dynastic trust savings in excess of 15% were $2 trillion, the gov-
ernment would set the tax rate at 25%. To illustrate the application of the 
tax at the taxpayer level, consider a trust containing $1 billion in assets that 
earned a 5% return and thus enjoyed $50 million in income. If the trust 
                                                                                                                           
 315 Other taxpayers, especially wealthy households, will also save at rates in excess of fifteen 
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saved 90% of its income, the dollar level of savings would be $45 million. 
The first 15% of this trust income (up to the golden rule rate), $7.5 million, 
would be exempt from the tax. The remaining $42.5 million ($50 million less 
the $7.5 million exemption) would be subject to the 25% tax, coming to 
$10.6 million. In order to insure that this tax would indeed reduce the national 
savings rate to the golden rule level, the government would use the proceeds 
to either (i) fund public goods or (ii) cut taxes of households with high pro-
pensities to consume—the usual assumption for lower-income households.317 
C. Taxing Dynastic Trusts to Address the Paradox of Thrift 
Addressing the shorter-term paradox of thrift calls for a different tax 
on perpetuities, albeit one with a number of parallels to the tax outlined in 
the preceding Section.318 As the paradox of thrift occurs only in times of 
slack demand (that is, recessions),319 this tax should be designed so that it 
does not go into effect unless the economy is sputtering. The key bench-
mark in setting the rate for this tax should be the size of the boost in aggre-
gate demand needed to restore full employment.320 Even with this guide, 
there is no single ‘right’ fraction of the burden to impose on dynastic trusts. 
In a paradox of thrift economy, many actors are trying to save more than is 
socially desirable. One simple and fair approach is (i) to estimate the (low-
er) national savings rate that would solve the paradox and raise demand 
enough to end the recession, and then (ii) tax all actors saving at a rate cal-
culated to reduce overall savings to this target rate. Given the extraordinari-
ly high savings rates necessary to make dynastic trusts viable,321 this tax 
would impose a heavy burden on dynastic trusts during recessions. 
This tax on excessive dynasty trust savings during recessions has an 
additional attractive feature as an “automatic stabilizer.” Economists use 
this label to describe policies and programs that, once in place, work auto-
matically to counteract economic downturns.322 Unemployment insurance 
and the higher deficits generated during recessions by falling tax revenues 
combined with relatively fixed government spending are common examples 
of such automatic stabilizers. The paradox of thrift tax works as an automat-
                                                                                                                           
 317 See Dynan et al., supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting higher savings by the 
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 318 See supra 315–317 and accompanying text. 
 319 See supra 242–265 and accompanying text. 
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ic stabilizer because during recessions it mechanically takes money that 
otherwise would go into excess savings and channels it to stimulate demand 
either through the purchase and production of goods and services or by cut-
ting taxes on lower-income households likely to spend all or most of the 
windfall. 
Before we move on, two points should be made about the externality 
taxes discussed in this and the prior Section.323 First, unlike the current es-
tate tax, there is no exemption level or progressive rate structure. Unlike the 
estate tax, these levies do not address fairness or equity concerns. They are 
designed to create disincentives to excessive savings, which poses a threat 
to the economy whether done by a small number of dynastic trusts with 
huge pools of assets or by a large number of dynastic trusts with relatively 
modest sums. Every excess dollar saved can stunt consumption growth and 
prolong recessions. In practice we expect most dynastic trusts to be created 
by the very wealthy as the per-beneficiary benefits flowing from a middle- 
or lower-class dynastic trust would be quite modest. 
Second, these taxes likely will induce many if not most would-be dyn-
asts either to refrain from setting up perpetual family trusts in the first place 
or to craft them in ways that avoid the heavy taxes outlined in this and the 
previous Section. Recessions occur with semi-predictable frequency324 and 
each will trigger a large trust income tax bill for the duration of the reces-
sion. Combined with the potential for a second levy to drive savings below 
the golden rule rate, taxation will seriously erode the ability of a dynastic 
trust to provide undiluted benefits generation after generation. 
Donors who nonetheless persevere with dynastic planning would pre-
fer to divert trust income from heavily taxed saving to some form of con-
sumption not subject to these taxes on perpetuities. Such trusts that avoid 
the high savings rates required for perpetual trusts to grow as fast as the 
class of beneficiaries impose neither of the negative externalities that moti-
vated the taxes that I advocate in this and the previous Section.325 There 
may be a few wealthy (and determined) donors who will nonetheless try to 
structure dynastic trusts to last as long as possible. That too poses no prob-
lem: if tax rates are set appropriately, trust fund tax payments will (roughly) 
compensate society for the harms caused by their excess savings. 
                                                                                                                           
 323 See supra 315–317 and accompanying text. 
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 325 See supra 315–317 and accompanying text. 
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D. Fostering the Dissipation of Dynastic Wealth 
The previous two Sections crafted externality tax solutions to the prob-
lems posed by dynasty trusts that over-save.326 These are efficiency measures: 
they disincentivize savings rates so high that they actually shrink national 
income. We identified a separate, equitable problem with dynasty trusts: they 
lock wealth into family trusts, preventing equality-enhancing dissipation of 
wealth forever. The externality taxes described above do nothing to alleviate 
the undesirable freezing of wealth into bloodlines for all eternity. 
The issue here revolves not around trust income but rather around trust 
principal. This is simply one form of wealth, and this suggests taxing dynas-
tic trust principal instead of the trust income targeted in the previous two 
Sections.327 As dynasty trusts are just one particularly stark example of the 
growing concentration of wealth that concerns Piketty, it is no surprise that 
his primary policy proposal fits for addressing the dissipation-blocking na-
ture of such trusts. 
Piketty’s “ideal tool” to “avoid [the] endless inegalitarian spiral”328 re-
sulting from r > g is a progressive global tax on capital. He concedes that 
many will dismiss this as a “dangerous illusion,” but observes that the in-
come tax received similarly negative commentary when first proposed.329 
One of his main justifications for taxing capital is that those enjoying very 
large capital incomes can effectively hide their income and either postpone 
paying taxes or avoid them altogether.330 He conceives of a wealth tax as 
substitute income taxation for those who own great wealth and therefore 
receive large capital income (in the form of dividends, interests, royalties, 
etc. . .). He conjectures that a top marginal wealth tax rate of 5% per year 
would suffice to prevent inequality from getting worse, and that a 10% rate 
could markedly reduce it.331 
Dynastic trusts fit well within this framework. They are a particularly 
potent tool in the “endless inegalitarian spiral” that America finds itself, and 
they enable beneficiaries to significantly postpone trust income taxation. 
The goal of dissipating dynastic wealth requires a tax rate in excess of the 
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relatively high return to capital enjoyed by possessors of large fortunes.332 
The key parameter is how fast society wishes to dissipate dynastic fortunes. 
If, for example, legislators wish to simulate the folklore belief that descend-
ants squander essentially all of a family fortune two generations after it is 
amassed they would set the “dissipation of wealth” tax rate on dynasty 
trusts at about 2% above returns enjoyed by the wealthy.333 If, as some evi-
dence suggests, wealthier actors earn returns in the 6–10% range.334 Piket-
ty’s call for a 10% wealth tax are within the range of reasonableness.  
E. And What of Large Estates Not Bequeathed via Dynasty Trusts? 
None of the three taxes outlined in the preceding Sections would apply 
to large estates passed outside of dynastic trusts.335 This omission does not 
signal tacit approval but rather limited focus. This Article shows how the 
imminent end of the federal estate tax, in tandem with the death of the RAP, 
enables the creation of dynastic wealth in America for the first time in the 
nation’s history. It then identifies the unnoticed social costs of dynasty 
trusts: inefficient excess saving and inequitable restraints on dissipation. 
Fairness in taxing estates not bequeathed via dynasty trusts falls outside of 
these domains. 
The fairness case for taxing large pools of wealth is compelling. Andrew 
Carnegie, one of the wealthiest men of America’s Gilded Age, deemed a pro-
gressive taxation of estates the “wisest” tax,336 and modern empirical work 
bears his view. Best evidence suggests that the estate tax does not disincentiv-
ize effort or saving and so imposes little deadweight loss.337 On top of this 
attractive efficiency profile, the very progressive federal estate tax is eminent-
ly fair. It imposes tax burdens on those best able to pay and for whom the 
marginal utility of an extra dollar of disposable income is presumably low,338 
enabling the state to impose lower taxes on those least able to pay for whom 
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the utility of a marginal increase in disposable income is high. Previous 
scholarship has made a strong fairness case for the estate tax.339 
The estate tax, however, is not the only tax that achieves these ends. In 
particular, Piketty’s progressive wealth tax would serve as an admirable re-
placement for the federal estate tax.340 Piketty tailored this tax precisely to 
address the disequalizing effects of r > g—effects caused as much by wealth 
outside of dynastic trusts as within. In addition, imposing an annual wealth 
tax instead of a once-a-generation estate tax has a number of advantages 
over the traditional estate tax. To the extent that the large one-time burden 
of the estate tax forces the sale of family businesses or farms341 and people 
feel such forced sales are undesirable, an annual wealth tax with a top mar-
ginal rate of 2% or 3% removes all such concerns. At these rates, net reve-
nue from family-run enterprises would cover the annual tax bill. Even if 
forced sales due to the estate tax are rare or non-existent, they have been a 
powerful political talking point for those opposed to taxing wealth, and 
Piketty’s wealth tax is immune to this rhetorical stratagem. 
It is also much more difficult for taxpayers to avoid a wealth tax. The 
state imposes an estate tax only about once every generation, giving taxpay-
ers decades to engage in planning to minimize their tax bill.342 It is inherent-
ly more difficult to hide assets from a tax assessed annually. The current 
(annual) federal income tax, with its wide-ranging information gathering 
machinery, provides a strong foundation for accurately calculating and col-
lecting an annual wealth tax. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that the demise of the RAP and the continuing de-
cline of the estate tax are particularly untimely and thus there is a need for 
remedial measures. This may give the impression that there is no relation 
between widening socioeconomic inequality and these legal changes. To the 
extent that money affects politics and lawmaking, we would be surprised if 
the top 1% enjoying a skyrocketing share of national income and wealth did 
not use their financial muscle to push for laws enabling them to entrench 
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their privilege and extend it to their descendants. We are at risk of entering a 
vicious cycle, in which an ever-wealthier elite use their fortunes to enact 
laws consolidating and extending their socioeconomic hegemony. The RAP 
and the estate tax are not the first targets, and almost surely will not be the 
last. 
Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century tells us that the economic 
landscape is tilting decidedly in the direction of concentrated and inherited 
wealth. It is unnerving to think that the wealthy already possess sufficient 
influence to tilt the playing field even more steeply in their own direction. It 
seems that we may have already entered a self-reinforcing cycle in which 
the wealthy buy laws that protect and extend their fortunes and therefore 
arm them with even more influence going forward. 
Piketty’s work sits at the center of a burgeoning literature on growing 
inequality, much of it motivated by equity and fairness concerns. The pri-
mary thrust of this Article, lies in the direction of efficiency. The death of 
the RAP and the weakened, possibly doomed federal estate tax pave the 
way for the creation of dynastic trusts. The high savings rate of trust in-
comes required to maintain privilege perpetually poses a real threat to both 
shorter-term management of business cycles (the paradox of thrift) and 
longer-term growth of welfare (saving rate exceeding the golden rule rate). 
Imposing these potentially large macroeconomic losses on everyone is a 
negative externality. The benefits of dynastic wealth to the top 1% are as-
suredly dwarfed by the costs of excessive savings, justifying the imposition 
of new taxes to (i) prevent saving above the golden mean rate, and (ii) avoid 
the paradox of thrift during recessions. 
Although England may have led the evolution from feudalism to de-
mocracy, and further pioneered restrictions on perpetuities, it nonetheless 
maintained a relatively rigid class system into the dawn of the twentieth 
century. A foundational principle in America’s violent separation from Eng-
land was the rejection of a privileged landed gentry perpetuated by the 
maintenance of large estates in family blood lines generation after genera-
tion. At the decisive battle of Yorktown, France provided vital aid to Ameri-
ca in shedding the yoke of the English system of inherited privilege and 
soon joined America in embracing democracy and rejecting aristocracy. 
Today French assistance comes in a humbler academic cloak: Piketty’s 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century. America has strayed from its egalitari-
an roots and ideals, stumbling from its traditional status as one of the most 
equal developed societies to one of the most unequal. Piketty has illuminat-
ed a formerly dark landscape and revealed powerful forces that are widen-
ing inequality and immobility in the twenty-first century. For the 99% of 
Americans who stand to be marginalized by these forces and the growing 
influence that goes with concentrated wealth, Piketty’s insights should be as 
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welcome as Admiral de Grasse’s ships at Yorktown. The enemy today of 
course is not the British. Rather, it is an emergent powerful homegrown 
American aristocracy, an aristocracy that may well be the moving force be-
hind the demise of the RAP and continuing attenuation of the estate tax—
with elimination remaining in their sights. Piketty has focused a spotlight on 
the threat to fundamental American ideals of equality and democracy. It re-
mains to be seen whether the institutions of democracy possess the power to 
resist the growing power of concentrated wealth. 
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APPENDIX A: SCENARIO IN WHICH THE SAVING RATE EXCEEDS THE 
“GOLDEN RULE” LEVEL 
This short appendix demonstrates that under plausible assumptions 
about parameter values, dynasty trusts could push the saving rate above the 
golden rule rate of 13–14%.343 
Piketty’s work demonstrates that capital’s share of national income 
could reach 50% in the twenty-first century,344 and that the top 1% could 
own 60% of this wealth.345 This means that potential dynasts’ capital in-
come will amount to 
(50% capital share of national income) * (60% of capital owned by top 
1%) 
= 30% of national income. 
If we assume that half of those in the top 1% form dynastic trusts and 
mandate that these trusts save 90% of their income to insure trust growth 
keeps up with beneficiary growth, the percent of national income saved by 
dynastic trusts comes to 
(50% of dynasts) * (90% savings rate) * (30% of national income) = 
13.5%. 
If the saving rate for the remaining 70% of national income is an his-
torically low 5%, that translates to saving 
(5% savings rate) * (70% of national income) = 3.5% 
of national income. Summing these two numbers yields an overall saving 
rate of 17%, in excess of the golden rule rate. 
The assumption that half of the households in the top 1% establish or 
are beneficiaries of dynasty trusts is the only step in these calculations 
without modern empirical support. In feudal England, however, the histori-
cal record suggests that under permissive laws the vast majority of noble 
households engaged in primogeniture and attempted to keep estates in the 
family bloodline forever. By this measure, the assumption that only half of 
the wealthiest families in the twenty-first century will establish dynasty 
trusts now that the law permits them may be on the low side. 
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